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"Patient safety is the reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associated with healthcare to an acceptable minimum. An
acceptable minimum refers to the collective notions of given current knowledge, resources available and the context in
which care was delivered weighed against the risk of non-treatment or other treatment."
[WHO 2009]
Harm
"Harm implies impairment of structure or function of the body and/or any deleterious effect arising there from,
including disease, injury, suffering, disability and death, and may be physical, social or psychological. Disease is a
physiological or psychological dysfunction. Injury is damage to tissues caused by an agent or event and suffering is the
experience of anything subjectively unpleasant. Suffering includes pain, malaise, nausea, depression, agitation, alarm, fear
and grief. Disability implies any type of impairment of body structure or function, activity limitation and/or restriction
of participation in society, associated with past or present harm."
[WHO 2009]
Errors of commission*
"The Institute ofMedicine's (IOM) 1999 report To Err Is Human reported that medical error accounted for between
44,000 and 98,000 deaths per year in the United States. To many, this was not a surprise and even underreported. The
fact is that this study was based on errors of commission only. Errors of commission would include situations in which
inappropriate actions were taken that resulted in something other than what was intended."
Errors of omission*
"On the flip side, errors of omission (which were not included in the IOM report) are situations in which inaction
contributed to a deviation from an intended path and outcome. Inactions may involve mistakes, slips, and lapses."
Three error types*
The three error types are:
Mistakes:
"Mistakes occur when an intended outcome is not achieved even though there was adherence to the steps in the plan.
This is usually a case in which the original plan was wrong, was followed, and resulted in an unintended outcome. For
instance, a facility purchases a new type of IV pump from a new manufacturer. A nurse is not present for the inservice
training to learn the new procedures on how to use the pump. The nurse begins her shift and is put in a position to use
the new IV pump. Acting on previous experience, she operates the new pump using the old procedure. As a result, a
patient is overmedicated and slips into a coma."
Lapses:
"Lapses are associated with our memories (e.g., lapses ofmemory, 'senior moments', etc.). These are generally not
observable events."
Slips:
"Slips are generally externalized, observable actions that are not in accordance with a plan. These are often referred to as
Freudian slips, in which a person may be thinking something but inadvertently says it so that someone else can hear it.
Slips are most often associated with the execution phase of cognition."




Almost a decade ago, there was a call to establish patient safety reporting systems that would operate
at local, regional and national levels; it was envisaged that these would help healthcare professionals
and organisations to learn from mistakes and lead to the development of interventions aimed at
mitigating against these errors. This policy call led to the creation of the National Reporting and
Learning System (NRLS). It however remains unclear whether reporting systems result in safer care.
Specialties such as orthopaedics pose a high potential risk of iatrogenic harm, and this clinical area
therefore represents a useful exemplar in which to study the opportunities offered by this national
repository of errors to improve the safety of orthopaedic care provision.
Aims
The aims of this thesis were to:
• understand the opportunities offered by the NRLS to ascertain the frequency, types and
causes of errors in orthopaedic surgery
• develop the risk prediction potential of the system
• offer critical reflections on the role of reporting systems for improving the care received by
orthopaedic patients.
Methods
Data on orthopaedic entries over the time period 2005—2008 were extracted from the National
Patient Safety Agency's NRLS. Given the high volume of orthopaedic error reports, an approach
was developed to prioritise areas most likely to result in patient harm. This approach was used to
select four key areas, and examples ofwork undertaken to reduce the harm associated with
orthopaedic surgery in these areas are presented. A detailed assessment of all orthopaedic deaths was
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also undertaken using an inductive approach of content analysis. A key aspect of this thesis was the
creation of the Orthopaedic Error Index for hospitals, which allows a national assessment of the
relative safety of provision of orthopaedic surgery. It uses existing principles of benchmarking to
identify outlier hospitals where a large proportion of harm occurs compared to other hospitals.
Results
There were 48,971 free-text reports of orthopaedic errors made available for analyses. These reports
were grouped into 15 categories, which have been used since inception of the NRLS. A method of
prioritising these categories of errors was developed which yielded an odds ratio of the most harmful
category of errors compared to the others; these included errors associated with implementation of
care and on-going monitoring/review [OR = 2.55 (95% CI 2.49, 2.62)]; self-harming behaviour [OR
= 1.60 (95% CI 1.30, 1.96)]; infection control [OR= 1.50 (95% CI 1.41, 1.61); treatment, procedure
[OR= 1.31 (95% CI 1.22, 1.42)]; and patient accidents [OR= 1.02 (95% CI 0.99, 1.05)]. In each of
these error categories, where possible, topics were selected where there was a paucity of national
guidelines on delivering safer orthopaedic care. All the deaths (n = 257) were also reviewed (2005—
2009). Four main thematic categories emerged: (1) stages of the surgical journey — 62% of deaths
occurred in the post-operative phase; (2) causes of patient death — 32% were related to severe
infections; (3) reported quality of medical interventions — 65% of patients experienced minimal or
delayed treatment; and (4) skills of healthcare professionals — 44% of deaths had a failure in non¬
technical skills. A single error could have multiple themes, hence all errors did not add up to 100%.
National alerts were then produced to mitigate risks associated with the use of digital tourniquets,
hip cement, and slips, trips and falls. Data from 155 hospitals were used to create an Orthopaedic
Error Index (OEI) which was normally distributed. The mean OEI was 7.09/year (SD 2.72); five
hospitals were identified as outliers, lying three standard deviations above the mean OEI. This is the
first time that a direct measure of patient safety has been created and used.
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Discussion
Reporting systems such as the NRLS offer a potentially important approach for orthopaedic
surgeons to better understand the safety considerations of their work. This work has shown that
content analyses and prioritisation of errors can be beneficial for large databases and can alert
orthopaedic surgeons to practices of unsafe care. Subsequent solutions to mitigate against these
errors can furthermore be developed. It is also possible to use the NRLS for risk prediction and
identify, earlier on, any hospitals that have significant variation in the severity and propensity of
errors. It is hoped that this work will catalyse efforts by a few in orthopaedic surgery to recognise
that unsafe care is a problem and needs to be better understood and appropriate solutions
developed.
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1. Patient safety literature and what it reveals
1.1. Introduction
Understanding of, and commitment to, patient safety worldwide has grown since the late 1990s.
This was prompted by two influential reports: To Err is Human [Kohn 1999] produced by the
Institute ofMedicine (IOM) in the United States (US) andHn Organisation with a Memory
[Department of Health 2000] produced by the United Kingdom (UK) Government's Chief Medical
Adviser. Both reports recognised that error was routine during the delivery of healthcare: affecting
something like one in 10 of all hospital patients. In a proportion of cases the harm produced was
serious, even fatal.
The reports also drew attention to the poor performance of healthcare, as a sector, worldwide, on
safety compared to most other high-risk industries. Notably, aviation has shown remarkable and
sustained improvements in the risk to passengers of air travel over four decades. Both reports called
for greater focus on, and commitment to, reducing the risks of healthcare.
Since then, the quest to improve the safety of care for patients has become a global movement.
Important bodies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) [World Health Assembly
Resolution], the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) [Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the
Gulf], the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) [Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality] and the European Commission [European Commission] have produced strategic
documents, initiated programmes of action, and galvanised the support of political and health
leaders worldwide.
This has led to a remarkable transformation in the way that patient safety is Hewed. Having been a
subject ofminority academic interest, it is now a firm priority for most healthcare systems. Yet, the
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current state of patient safety worldwide is still a source of deep concern. As data on the scale and
nature of errors and adverse events have been more widely gathered, it has become apparent that
unsafe actions are a feature of virtually every aspect of healthcare. Reports of the deaths of patients
regularly feature in media reports in many countries and undermine public confidence in the health
services available to citizens. Moreover, many events recur with efforts to prevent them ineffective.
These could be in part due to a punitive culture of individual blame and system failures in ensuring
safer care.
Various definitions have been used throughout this review, details ofwhich can be found in the
Glossary.
Unsafe care is responsible for a substantial disease burden, and this has been studied extensively in
hospitals for the past decade; the prevalence of harm due to all episodes of secondary care has been
estimated at around one in 10 patients. [Baker GR 2004, Brennan TA 1991, Davis P 2002, Schioler
T 2001, Thomas EJ 2000, Vincent C 2001] In Colorado and Utah hospitals, 6.6% of adverse events
led to death; compared with 13.6% in New York hospitals. In both of these studies, over half of
these adverse events resulted from medical errors and could have been prevented. [Brennan TA
1991, Leape LL 1991] This figure, when extrapolated for the entire US system, which constitutes in
excess of 30 million admissions annually, would imply that 44,000 Americans die as a result of
medical errors per year. The total national cost in the US of preventable adverse events associated
with a surgical procedure could be as high as $30 billion. [Kohn LT 1999] In the UK, a review of
1,010 records found an adverse error rate of 10.8%. Half of these errors were also deemed
preventable. [Vincent C 2001]
The liarvard study [Brennan TA 1991] found 47.7% and the Australian study [Wilson RL 1995]
found 50.4% of adverse events were associated with a surgical operation. The Utah Colorado
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Medical Practice Study provided additional data on operative events. The annual incidence rate of
adverse events among hospitalised patients who received an operation was 3.0%. Among all surgical
events, 54% were deemed to be preventable. Eight operations were 'high risk', based upon their
preventable adverse event rate: lower extremity bypass graft (11.0%); abdominal aortic aneurysm
repair (8.1%); colon resection (5.9%); coronary artery bypass graft/cardiac valve surgery (4.7%);
transurethral resection of the prostate or of a bladder tumour (3.9%); cholecystectomy (3.0%);
hysterectomy (2.8%); and appendectomy (1.5%). Technique-related complications, wound infections
and post-operative bleeding produced nearly half of all surgical adverse events.
1.1.1. Typologies of errors
The link between complication and error was analysed in 9,830 surgical procedures. [Fabri P) 2008]
Major complications occurred in 3.4% of patients, with errors in four out of five complications; with
those errors forming the major part in three-quarters of those complications. In other words, of 322
complications, about 60% were predominantly due to human error, reflecting the view that, if these
can be addressed, about half of surgical complications are avoidable. [Leape LL 1991, Neale G 2001]
These errors were related to surgical technique (63.5%), judgement errors (29.6%), inattention to
detail (29.3%) and incomplete understanding (22.7%). In contrast to other studies, system errors
(2%) and communication errors (2%) were infrequently identified. Of these complications, 16%
resulted in death. The epidemiology of error in medicine which can quite easily be extrapolated to
surgery and, indeed, orthopaedic surgery has shown that safety is a major concern in six main areas —
problems of: (1) access; (2) communication leading to breakdown in patient/clinician relationships;
(3) diagnostic errors; (4) prescribing errors; (5) errors in organisational systems; and (6) technological
failures. [Wilson T 2002] Authors have attempted to categorise the causes of, and solutions to, errors
in patient care. Vincent suggested that error occurs at the different levels of: institution;
organisational management; the workplace environment; the team; the individual staffmember; the
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specific task; and the patient. [Vincent C 2003] This concurs with much of the literature which
recognises that errors may be a result of a number of co-existing human and systems factors.
In the UK, complication rates for some of the major operations are 20—25%. [Gordon NLM 1993]
However, at least 30—50% ofmajor complicadons occurring in patients undergoing general surgical
procedures are thought to be avoidable. [Healey MA 2002] The wide variation in surgical
complication rates between different centres and different surgeons would support this view. Many
adverse events classified as operative are, on closer examination, found to be due to problems
related to ward management rather than intra-operative care. For instance, Neale and colleagues
[Neale G 2001] identified preventable pressure sores, chest infections, falls and poor care of urethral
catheters in their study of adverse events, together with a variety of problems with the
administration of drugs and intravenous fluids.
A recent survey of 917/5,540 American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons (AAOS) fellows revealed
the top 10 errors (Table 1.1). By location, 78% of errors occurred in the hospital (54% in the surgery
suite and 10% in the patient room or floor). The reporting orthopaedic surgeon was involved in
60% of the errors; a nurse in 37%; another orthopaedic surgeon in 19%; other physicians in 16%;
and house staff in 13%. [Wong DA 2009]
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Table 1.1: Top 10 errors in orthopaedic surgery according to American Academy ofOrthopedic Surgeons survey
Type of error Percentage reported by
responders (n=917)
Communication failure 24.7
Equipment and/or instrumentation problem in operating room 20.0
Improper technique and/or physician impairment 12.7
Patient injury event 10.6
Equipment problem with implants 9.0
Wrong site surgery 8.2
Medication error 8.2
Transition of care problem 6.3
Imaging studies problem 6.1
Blood or tissue event 5.5
Source: Wong DA 2009
1.1.2. Why do errors occur?
Surgical competency involves a combination of good decision-making (pre-operatively, operatively
and post-operatively), team performance and communication (surgical, anaesthetic, nursing and
other essential staffmembers), and technical skills. [Birkmeyer JD 2002, Begg CB 2002] It is
unlikely that no errors occur throughout the surgical process, even for the most simple of cases.
Taking the example of the lead surgeon, he or she will be: constantly checking and re-checking
documentation (salient communications); re-appraising the clinical and theatre setting; and
constantly re-evaluating the patient's care and the progress of the operation. This is done with the
aim of reducing the error rate occurring during this process to a bare minimum. But errors still
happen. However, the occurrence of surgical error is part of a multifaceted phenomenon and
adhering to protocols is only part of the answer. This is because a cascade of glitches from various
elements, with different controlling factors, can/may culminate in a catastrophe or adverse event.
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The 'Swiss cheese' model (Figure 1.1) characterises healthcare in that the system may look robust,
but with a closer look, it is full of holes. [Reason ] 2000; see Appendix 2]
Figure 1.1: The 'Swiss cheese' model ofhow defences, barriers and safeguards may be penetrated by an accident
trajectory
To understand why errors occur generally, the psychologist Rasmussen developed the Skill,
Knowledge & Rule Error Model. [Rasmussen [ 1983] At the skill level, actions are automatic and are
enacted by way of "stored patterns of pre-programmed instructions". These actions are frequently
performed and are often said to 'come naturally' to the operator. However, these skills can be
acquired with practice. On a rule level, tasks are completed using stored sets of rules. These rules
consist of familiar, rehearsed patterns of actions. Tasks which use rule-based cognitive mechanisms
require a greater degree of thought than skill-based tasks, as the rules which need to be applied to
complete the situation must be selected. On a knowledge level, unfamiliar tasks are performed with
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a high degree of conscious thought as the operator attempts to devise a novel solution to a situation
which has not previously been encountered. Reason used Rasmussen's classification as a framework
for his categorisation of errors, attaching a specific type of error to the three levels of cognitive
performance: errors in execution of skill-based tasks were termed lapses, and errors in execution of
rule and knowledge-based behaviours were termed mistakes in his Generic Error-Modelling System.
Lapses characteristically relate to an error in the actual execution of the task, whilst mistakes are
more abstract errors, relating to errors in planning (where a strategy not suitable for the situation is
carried out), or in problem-solving. In the case of lapses, the plan is correct but the actions are
carried out incorrectly, leading to an error; whereas in the case of mistakes, the actions are carried
out correctly, but it is instead the plan which is incorrect.
Training in healthcare and surgery par excellence focuses on technical skills. Whilst essential, this fails
to recognise that surgeons cannot perform to the best of their technical ability unless they are in a
well-functioning team. Every surgeon will have experienced the frustrations of a list that is full of
delays and appears poorly prepared. These lists are often performed amidst growing friction and
failing communication. Most surgeons will also have experienced a very good list, where things flow
smoothly and everything falls into place. The work is completed quicker, with less effort and better
outcomes. The rest of the team feel the same way and are equally aware of the impact of poor
teamwork on the patient. Staff turnover and sickness rates are inversely related to the perception of
team performance. The most discerning element of team performance is how safe team members
feel to speak up if they see something going wrong. In many cases ofwrong site surgery, someone in
theatre knew it was happening but felt unable to say so.
The theme of teamwork and communication frequently arises in studies of surgical performance and
patient safety, in part because care is delivered in multi-professional teams, and because teamwork
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can mediate the relationship between system threats and human errors. In principle, good teamwork
results in better avoidance of error-inducing situations (through anticipation and workload
management); an improved ability to detect mistakes (through mutual monitoring and support); and
better response in a crisis.
Catchpole and colleagues examined teamwork skills in relationship to process problems. [Catchpole
K 2008a] They found that in some operations, operating time increased significantly with better
anaesthetic leadership, but decreased with better surgical leadership. There are two explanations for
this: either that longer and more difficult operations require better leadership from the anaesthetist;
or that stronger leadership from an anaesthetist might help surgeons (who often pride themselves on
how quickly they can perform an operation) to consider safety over speed. The study also found that
errors in surgical technique had a strong association with surgical situation awareness, while most
other process problems were related to the leadership and management skills of the nurses.
ElBardissi and colleagues also found a strong correlation between technical error and teamwork
failure, this time suggesting familiarity is important. [ElBardissi AW 2008] Lingard has also produced
an excellent sequence of studies looking specifically at communication in operating teams. In this
study, [Lingard L 2004] the researchers noted that the dominant themes of communication were
time, safety and sterility, resources, roles and situation. At least one instance of tension from these
communications was found in every one of the 35 procedures, which had a negative impact on
teamwork and other aspects of performance. Surgical trainees' propensity to either not
communicate, or to simply mimic the senior surgeon, appear to make these conflicts worse.
Communication failures were found to occur in 30% of team exchanges, with a third of these
leading to process problems, increased cognitive load, interruptions or increased tension; thus
jeopardising patient safety. Poor timing, missing information, unclear purpose and wrong audience
were cited as the sources of these failures. [Lingard L 2004]
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Formal methods of communication deliver improved team performance as they help to remove
hierarchy and the fear of speaking up, and they prepare team members for the expected as well as
the unexpected, and ensure everyone is 'singing from the same hymn sheet'. Sporting teams spend
many hours practising together to ensure players know what is expected of them, what the plan is
and how to react if it goes wrong. Surgeons tend to assume the scrub nurse remembers what might
happen; that the system has delivered the appropriate amount of cross-matched blood and the right
antibiotics; that the images are ready and available; and that everyone else knows what they are
thinking. It truth, these systems function correctly less than 75% of the time and many patients
simply don't get what is expected. The human mind can store, at best, seven or eight items in the
short-term memory. That's why telephone numbers are seven or eight digits long. Stress, which is
part of our everyday work, makes this even less reliable. Staff members who work in theatres are
regularly trying to remember 20—25 things, are interrupted in their work 10—15 times an hour, and
interact with numerous different teams during the working day. Some of this is frustrating, but not
ultimately harmful, for our patients. Many, however, are, and a significant numbers of these 'errors'
lead to significant harm or even death. [Emerton M 2009]
Fatigue is amongst the most well recognised contributors to the potential for error. When examining
the effects of time of day on adverse events, Wright found that an adverse event was four times
more likely in an operation that started at 4pm than 9am, although they admit this may be due to
patient-related factors (and may also be related to time pressure on operating lists, which is discussed
in detail later). [Wright MC 2006] A web survey of 2,737 US resident doctors also found that long
work shifts were associated with an increased risk of significant medical errors, adverse events and
attention failures in trainees. [Barger LK 2006] Most recently, a large retrospective analysis found
decreased mortality and morbidity in trauma patients when doctors were limited to an 80-hour
working week. [Morrison CA 2009]
23
The problem of unsafe care in orthopaedic surgery is a real one. It can no longer be neglected;
understanding the frequency and types of errors, coupled with developing solutions to unsafe
practices is a good start to delivering harm-free orthopaedic care. A key starting point in this journey
is the use of a patient safety reporting system.
1.2. Patient safety reporting systems: an opportunity to understand the
frequency and causes of healthcare errors in orthopaedic surgery
1.2.1. A global perspective: taking stock of databases of errors
The key output from patient safety initiatives is to prevent harm to the patient, and key tools in this
respect are patient safety reporting systems (PSRSs), which help us learn from mistakes and should
lead to the development of interventions aimed at mitigating against these errors. Reporting must be
coupled with measures of action and there are several methods by which PSRSs can achieve success:
generation of alerts on complications of new drugs; dissemination of lessons learned by healthcare
organisations experiencing serious patient safety incidents (PSIs); and revelation of unrecognised
trends. [Leape LL 2002]
Methods of identification of incidents vary significantly between countries. Physicians, safety
officers, and patients and their families may be involved. Some systems centre on certain types of
events (e.g. medication error); whereas others focus on events where serious harm occurred; and
some are more all-encompassing. Methods of analysis and prioritisation of risk also vary widely
between different systems. A common approach is an in-depth root cause analysis of one event,
with production of a report that is then widely disseminated. Other approaches include online
publication of the virtually unaltered description of the incident. Rates of harm are also calculated in
different ways, making summation of data problematic. Use of checklist reporting forms versus free-
text; web-based versus paper recording; and inconsistent approaches to prioritising the significance
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of events, further confound data problems. In general, proving reduction in harm resulting from the
use of reporting system data is not yet feasible. Methods of incident mitigation range from individual
feedback, local educational meetings, production of national alerts, and media or web-based releases.
Determining the best level for a risk reduction intervention (local, regional, national or international)
is at a rudimentary stage of development. Evaluation of the effectiveness of systems is also under¬
developed, and in many cases not present. Although a belief is often present that things are getting
better, data supporting this are lacking. In fact, due to the increased number of reports collected,
data often suggest the opposite. [Noble Dj 2011]
Additionally, the number of different systems in existence encourages bureaucracy and lack of clarity
regarding taxonomies, [Arah OA 2004] as well as potentially stifling local, regional, national and
international learning and change. [Donaldson L 2004] Overall, national systems are better
developed than regional and local systems.
1.2.2. Reporting systems operating at multiple levels
Following are four examples of reporting systems from different countries:
1. Osaka University Hospital introduced a voluntary and anonymous online reporting system
which allows capture of electronic information about adverse events. This information is subject
to daily analysis by a member of the clinical risk management committee. Findings and lessons
learned are shared at regular educational staff meetings. The programme has driven the
development of several risk reduction initiatives. Their experience has led them to believe that
web-based models with effective sharing of information have led to a reduction in physician
under-reporting compared to previous studies in japan. [Nakajima K 2005]
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2. The Intensive Care Unit Safety Reporting System (ICUSRS) has been used in 18 different
intensive care units (ICU) in the US. It was created at Johns Hopkins Hospital for use in ICUs
to provide an anonymous, voluntary and confidential system for incident reporting. It focuses
on collecting web-based reports from all healthcare workers in an ICU and producing a
monthly report which is fed back to the individual ICU and also includes comparative data
from other ICUs. It includes a built-in evaluation section for the reporter. [Thompson DA
2005]
3. The Pennsylvania PSRS receives reports of serious events and incidents from 528 healthcare
facilities within the region. It also collects data on healthcare associated infections (HCAI),
which come from 700 nursing homes. There is a legal requirement for these healthcare facilities
to report to this reporting system. Like most PSRSs, the aim is to collect data, identify trends,
learn from reports and recommend changes in healthcare practices and procedures that may be
instituted to reduce the number and severity of future serious events and incidents. There have
been 528 hospitals, ambulatory surgical facilities, abortion facilities and birthing centres who
have submitted 226,670 reports of serious events and incidents to the authority in 2009; an
increase of 6,796 reports from 2008. In 2009, the authority received 18,889 reports per month
on average; an increase of 3% from 2008. Approximately 96% of all reports submitted by these
facilities in 2009 were near-miss incidents, or did not cause harm to the patient. Approximately
4% of all reports were submitted as serious events, indicating that the patient suffered some
level of harm, ranging from minor, temporary harm to death. [Pennsylvania Patient Safety
Authority 2010]
4. Jeder Fehler Zaehlt is an online reporting system for general practitioners in Germany. Data are
entered anonymously and voluntarily, and reports of key incidents are published on the website,
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where users can learn and comment. It is one of the few systems solely focused on primary
care. [Jeder Fehler Zaehlt 2010]
Various medical specialties have enjoyed varying degrees of success with different types of reporting
systems. A voluntary and anonymous online system for neonatal units in 54 hospitals was studied
amongst 739 healthcare workers from the Vermont Oxford Network. It revealed a typical pattern of
incident epidemiology, the most frequent type of incident being medication errors. [Suresh G 2004]
National systems have been more ambitious in their aims; the most well-known being the National
Reporting and Learning System (NRLS). However, the oldest national system is the Australian
Incident Monitoring System (AIMS), which has been used in Australia for over 20 years, having
originated from an adverse event reporting system in anaesthesia in the 1980s. AIMS was engineered
by the Australian Patient Safety Foundation (APSF), who were given the responsibility of
developing a system for reporting adverse events and near misses in Australia in 1996 for public
sector hospitals.
The system of reporting used by AIMS has specific software for collecting confidential data, and for
classifying and producing reports to prevent future error. The software allows individual units to
compare frequency of incidents with other providers. [Australian Patient Safety Foundation 2010]
AIMS was recently renamed as the Advanced Incident Monitoring System and is marketed
internationally by Patient Safety International. [Patient Safety International 2010] Other countries
such as New Zealand, as well as the UK, have benefited from this early work. Data are anonymous
and are used to identify trends which can be compared nationally, as well as communicated through
reports produced by the APSF. Under-reporting from medical practitioners has been a criticism, as
has the omission of the most serious incidents.
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England and Wales have been spearheading the patient safety agenda, initially through the creation
of the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) in 2003 as a specially-designated strategic health
authority, and this in turn led to the development of the NRLS database of patient safety incidents.
This database is now the largest of its kind in the world, having already received (as of 1 January
2013) over seven million reports of episodes of care that could or did result in iatrogenic harm.
Reports continue to accrue at an accelerating rate, with the database currently receiving
approximately a quarter of a million cases per quarter. [Panesar SS 2009a]
Data are arranged categorically, comprising of 75 data fields, including: incident categories at two
levels; specialty and location of the incident; and free-text description of the event. The largest
proportion of incidents originates from medical specialties (34%), surgical specialties (16%), mental
health (13%), and obstetrics and gynaecology (10%). Of note is that the proportion of reports from
primary care has been particularly low (5%), for reasons that as yet remain poorly understood.
[Panesar SS 2009a] Data from the NRLS are published in a number of formats including summative
quarterly reports for England and Wales. Individual organisational reports have also been released
showing reporting rates benchmarked against other similar organisations. [Panesar SS 2009a] This
allows for a middle-ground approach; allowing for a certain degree of disclosure, and yet also
maintaining a certain degree of disclosure, which ensures anonymity and allows both patients and
clinicians to appreciate the results.
The gross under-reporting to the database has been cited as its Achilles heel, and opponents of its
use have cited its use to warning, communication and detection of rare patient safety incidents.
[Vincent C 2008] Whilst this may be a valid criticism, it is clear that reporting is increasing as
clinicians become more aware of the presence of the NRLS and develop confidence that there will
28
not be any personal repercussions to making reports. Convincing clinicians of the usefulness of the
data they contribute should in due course further increase the frequency and quality of reporting.
Medication errors have frequendy been cited as the common type of adverse event. Reporting
systems, such as the anonymous MEDMARX system, have been very successful in quantifying and
responding to incidents. Almost 900 hospitals have taken part in submitting information and over
one million reports have been received — one of the few systems with a similar number of overall
reports to the NRLS. The system provides a way of sharing data between healthcare providers and
has contributed information in specific areas, such as operating theatre medication errors. [Santell }P
2003, Beyea SC 2003] Such a defined database in a specific area is likely to reveal important lessons
for more comprehensive reporting systems, for example, using targeted reporting when something
new is introduced into the system; understanding that the most significant errors are only a signpost
to the vast majority; and unravelling their detail, even in the face of vast quantities of reports (not
necessarily a waste of time as it may lead to increased predictive powers to detect error).
[MEDMARX 2002]
Some specialties have opted for specialty-specific reporting systems. A good example of this is the
Confidential Reporting System for Surgery (CORESS), which relies on surgical trainees and
consultants reporting untoward incidents on a data sheet. These 'stories' then undergo editorial
review and are published in the form of quarterly reports with advice on preventing the error from
occurring again. Anonymity of the patient and the clinician is maintained throughout the process.
The person who submitted the case receives a certificate. To date, less than 100 incidents have been
reported. [CORESS 2010]
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1.2.3. The tole of the World Health Organization
WHO has a key role to play in reporting and learning systems. Guidelines developed in 2005, which
are readily available, were developed by the WHO Patient Safety Programme [WHO 2005] and
present information for countries on areas such as the purpose and methods of reporting,
components of a reporting system, and a guide and checklist to setting up a national system.
[Donaldson L 2006] These are at a conceptual rather than operational level. Controversial issues
such as voluntary versus mandatory reporting, anonymous or confidential reporting, and resource
allocation are covered. To date, WHO has released information in a selection of areas to improve
patient safety, such as in surgery and reducing errors in the delivery of chemotherapy. However,
realising an orange-wire system, that translates critical information internationally, as advocated in
the guideline, is, as yet, a far-reaching goal. [Donaldon L 2004] This is in part due to the lack of
regulatory authority thatWHO has over countries, and that at present most country's reporting
systems are hosted by governmental agencies.
One future approach may be to imitate the aviation industry's approach to such a problem:
following a number of airline crashes some years ago, the aviation industry brought together all
relevant partners (including regulatory bodies and technical experts) under one banner: Commercial
Aviation Safety Team (CAST). This body has been able to demonstrably reduce fatalities in aviation,
and recently the creation of a similar body in healthcare has been advocated. [Pronovost P] 2009]
1.2.4. Translating reporting into action
WHO holds the following hope for reporting systems:
"The currency ofpatient safety can only be measured in terms ofharm prevented and lives saved. It is the vision of the
[WHO] that effectivepatient safety reporting systems will help to make this a realityfor futurepatients worldwide. "
[WHO 2005]
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The true value of a reporting system is dependent on its input and if clinicians fail to supply useful
information, the outputs will be meaningless. Reporting systems can be classed according to incident
identification, analysis and prioritisation of incidents, methods of risk mitigation and evaluation
mechanisms. National systems are better developed than regional and local systems, but evaluation
of effectiveness and translatability into action is significantly under-developed.
1.3. The National Reporting and Learning System: an opportunity for
orthopaedic surgeons to understand the level of harm in the specialty
The NRLS was initially a voluntary, national reporting system set up in 2003 for the National Health
Sendee (NHS) in England and Wales. In April 2010, reporting of serious untoward incidents (those
that constituted severe harm and death) became mandatory. [NPSA 2010a] One of the largest and
most comprehensive reporting systems in the world, the number of incidents reported to it increases
year on year. [Lamont T 2009] All staff working within the NHS can report incidents through their
parent institution to ensure local action can be taken when needed. A representative from each
parent institution is responsible for uploading records to the national database. In addition,
healthcare staff, patients and members of the public can report incidents independently through the
NRLS website. [NRLS]
Each NRLS report refers to an unintended or unexpected incident that could have or did lead to
harm for one or more patients receiving NHS-funded care. It also includes the reporting of
incidents that reached the patient but did not lead to harm, and those which did not lead to harm
because an incident was prevented from reaching the patient. These incidents are further stratified
into different levels of harm. When a patient safety incident report is made, a record of it is stored
digitally in a safety management system in the NHS organisation. The information is gathered, de-
identified and stored in the NRLS. Incidents can be directly reported to the NRLS via a web-based
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open-access system, but they are usually entered into a local database by administrative staff or the
local clinical risk manager, who transcribes a paper-based primary critical incident report. In order to
integrate the wide variety of local safety management systems and software, the NRLS has 75 data
fields (see Appendix 3), including incident categories at two levels, specialty and location of the
incident, and free-text descriptions of the events. [Catchpole K 2008b] Each incident reported as
leading to death or serious harm is reviewed individually by trained clinical staff and a range of
outputs are produced to provide solutions to patient safety problems. These include one-page
reports called Rapid Response Reports (RRR), quarterly data summaries and topic-specific
information on topics such as preventing inpatient falls in hospitals. There is constant consultation
with subject-matter experts, including professional organisations such as the Royal Colleges. NHS
organisations also have deadlines imposed on them by which time they should have implemented
any findings from these reports (see section 1.4.1).
1.4. The National Reporting and Learning System
1.4.1. Background
A decade ago, there was a call for the urgent development of a national database of medical error in
England and Wales; the vision was that this would help the medical fraternity better understand the
epidemiology of errors that caused harm and those that did not; define research priorities in this
area; and develop error reduction strategies. [Sheikh A 1999] This call arose out of the
recommendations of two key reports from the US and Australia, which highlighted the need for
patient safety to be an integral part of health policy considerations. [Wilson RL 1995, Kohn LT
1999] The scope of this chapter is to critically reflect on the progress that has been achieved with
respect to the creation of the NRLS.
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Domestic and international health policy has prioritised the importance of reducing the burden of
iatrogenic harm, the latter mandate coming through the WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety.
[WHO 2008] One of the initiatives consistently identified as of highest priority in such deliberations
has been the need for the creation of PSRSs — this favourable policy climate has enabled several
such systems to have been created in countries such as Australia, Germany, some states in the US,
and England and Wales. [Clinton PIR 2006]
When first envisioned, the underlying model for the NRLS was simple: it would be a fully
mandatory reporting scheme for medical errors. [Department of Health 2000] The main arguments
for mandatory systems is that these allow a truly comprehensive picture of the patient safety
landscape to emerge and, furthermore, that these improve healthcare professionals' sense of
accountability. It has, however, subsequently been noted that mandatory systems deter practitioners
and hospitals from reporting incidents as they fear public disclosure will lead to possible comeback
for the reporting physician or trust. [Leape LL 2002]
The NPSA did consider a mandatory reporting model, but in the end opted for a voluntary,
anonymised reporting structure in the hope of enabling fuller disclosure of incidents without fear of
reprisal on the part of the individual making the report. [Department of Health 2000] The approach
used allows patient safety incidents to be reported via a web-based open access system, or the more
popular system whereby reports are submitted in an anonymised fashion via the individual
organisation's local risk management system.
Analysis of the reported incidents by the NPSA has helped lead to the identification of possible
solutions to these problems (see Table 1.2 for details of published RRRs). Whilst these have proved
useful, there remain several challenges associated with the analysis and interpretation of data, which
largely reflect issues with the architecture of the NRLS. The approaches used for analyses of reports
33
include stratified sampling of frequendy occurring incident types and free-text data mining for
specific topics. The very large number of case reports being received renders it difficult to undertake
detailed analysis of all incidents. [Panesar SS 2009a] Such analysis is also compromised by the lack of
detail in many of the reports received and, because reports are anonymised, the lack of opportunity
to easily go back to those making the reports or to case notes to identify further information.
The gross under-reporting to the database has been a cause for concern and, as such, its use is often
limited to warning, communication and detection of rare patient safety incidents. [Vincent C 2008].
Whilst this may be a valid criticism, it is clear that reporting is increasing as clinicians become more
aware of its presence and furthermore develop confidence that there will not be any personal
repercussions to making reports.
Also of relevance in this context is the varying degree of engagement by different professional
groups. Nurses in particular are good reporters; in contrast, consultants are very poor reporters.
Convincing clinicians of the usefulness of the data they contribute should, in due course, further
increase the frequency and quality of reporting.
Consequently, clinical problems tend to be under-reported, whilst other potentially less serious, non¬
clinical problems are perhaps over-represented. It is still proving difficult to engage senior clinicians
in a generic reporting system. In order to try and overcome these problems, the NPSA engaged
frontline and senior clinicians, and undertook two pilot projects aimed at improving reporting from
general practice and anaesthesia. Working with the Royal College of Anaesthetists and the Royal
College of General Practitioners, two bespoke reporting systems have been developed. These are
incorporated into the architecture of the NRLS. Encouragingly, the former has been a success and
there has been a significant improvement in the level of reporting from anaesthetists. [NPSA 2008a]
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The impact of the latter work with the Royal College of General Practitioners is currently being
assessed.
Initially, the NPSA produced detailed patient safety solutions that, when evaluated, proved difficult
for organisations to implement. Simpler solutions were then developed using a one-page format
which outlines the problems and describes actions that can be taken to help prevent other patients
being similarly harmed. NHS organisations are now also provided with supporting information that
describes in considerable detail the relevant contextual data from the reporting system, together with
advice on implementation considerations. These RRRs cover a wide range of issues, from
resuscitation in mental health and the risks of amphotericin toxicity, to the risk of bone cement
implantation syndrome in hip fracture surgery (see Table 1.2).
The challenges of improving patient safety in healthcare remain significant. The national database
represents an important step, and is an important resource in ensuring that information about
adverse events are both learned from and shared throughout the NHS. All clinicians, regardless of
specialty can contribute to these efforts by reporting patient safety incidents to the NRLS. Whilst
important challenges remain in relation to encouraging fuller, franker and more comprehensive
reporting, and then meaningfully analysing these data, it is fair to conclude that substantial progress
has been made. As a clear leader in reporting systems, the successes and failures of the NRLS are
likely to have major implications on reporting systems in other parts of the UK and internationally,
and so it is very much in the collective interests of patients nationally and internationally that
healthcare professionals engage with, report to and make use of this resource to the best of their
ability.
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1.4.2. How are national outputs developed?
Within an NHS trust, patient safety incidents reported on the ward are forwarded to the risk
manager. These should then be reviewed locally to identify any areas where action can be taken to
make services safer — for instance, a ward reporting repeated errors with certain high-risk injectable
medicines. But they are also uploaded to the NRLS. This has been designed as the push of a button
by local risk managers, to minimise burden on trusts — this means that at a national level, all
incidents are received, however trivial. These are mapped against data fields, which are being
updated to align with international patient safety classification terms.
Most incidents come from locally uploaded data, as described above. A minority (less than 1%) are
received from web-based reports from individual clinicians. Some also come through particular
specialty-specific initiatives, such as the reporting scheme set up in partnership with the Royal
College of Anaesthetists (as described in section 1.4.1). This includes more detailed taxonomy
around particular areas of clinical interest, such as difficult airways.
The challenge is to identify the most pressing risks and issues from the vast database of over seven
million incidents. In addition to wider trends and patterns, each incident reported as resulting in
severe harm or death is now scrutinised by clinical staff, in particular the free-text description of the
incident. These are screened to focus on the incidents which suggest wider system problems that
could affect a number of trusts. Over 300 serious incidents are carefully reviewed in this way each
month and a few are selected for further work. They are discussed at a weekly multidisciplinary
meeting. More evidence from the wider database is sought at this stage, together with data from
other sources such as litigation as well as international sources (such as the Pennsylvania Safety
Agency). NRLS staffmay also go back to trusts reporting serious harm events at this stage for more
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information about what action was taken locally. A wide range of clinical advice is sought for further
understanding of the problem and possible actions to reduce harm.
Criteria for urgent action are:
• evidence of substantive harm from incident data or other sources
• risks not well recognised by staff
• clear actions available to prevent harm.
Issues which meet these criteria are developed as RRRs (see Table 1.2). These are usually produced
within two to four months of the incident report, although some are produced in a matter ofweeks
when swift action is needed (for instance, to prevent risks to haemodialysis patients from additives
to hospital water supply).
The NRLS is the largest database of patient safety incidents around the world. To date, there has
been a lack of a systematic approach to identify errors that cause the greatest degree of harm. The
approach has also been reactive and most solutions have been developed after these incidents have
occurred. The sheer volume of incidents makes prioritisation and analyses challenging. In
subsequent chapters, I will use the example of orthopaedic surgery to assess the potential of the
system for better understanding the frequency, typology and causes of errors, and test the risk
prediction-ability of the database.
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Table 1.2: Rapid Response Reports to date
Date Topic Title
22 Mar 2012 Nasogastric feeding tubes
Harm from flushing of nasogastric tubes before
confirmation of placement
28 Nov 2011 Intravenous equipment
Minimising risks of mismatching spinal, epidural and
regional devices with incompatible connectors
26 Oct 2011 Medium-chain acyl-CoA dehydrogenase deficiency
Keeping newborn babies with a family history of
MCADD safe in the first hours and days of life
20 Mar 2011 Insulin The adult patient's passport to safer use of insulin
10 Mar 2011 Nasogastric feeding tubes
Reducing the harm caused by misplaced nasogastric
feeding tubes in adults, children and infants
31 Jan 2011 Intrathecal, epidural and regional medicines Safer spinal (intrathecal), epidural and regional devices
13 Jan 2011 Falls Essential care after an inpatient fall
16 Dec 2010 Ambulatory syringe drivers Safer ambulatory syringe drivers
25 Nov 2010 Loading doses Preventing fatalities from medication loading doses
21 Oct 2010 Blood transfusion
The transfusion of blood and blood components in
an emergency
23 Sept 2010 Laparoscopic surgery
Laparoscopic surgery: Failure to recognise post¬
operative deterioration
26 Aug 2010 Intravenous fluids and medicines
Prevention of over infusion of intravenous fluid and
medicines in neonates
30 July 2010 Low molecular weight heparins
Reducing treatment dose errors with low molecular
weight heparins
16 June 2010 Insulin Safer administration of insulin
26 May 2010 Retained swabs
Reducing the risk of retained swabs after vaginal birth
and perineal sutering
28 Apr 2010 Surgery Checking pregnancy before surgery
31 Mar 2010 Gastrostomies Early detection of complications after gastrostomy
24 Feb 2010 Omitted or delayed medicines
Reducing harm from omitted and delayed medicines
in hospital
9 Feb 2010 Intravenous gentamicin Safer use of intravenous gentamicin for neonates
21 Jan 2010 Immunisation Vaccine cold storage
9 Dec 2009 Tourniquets
Reducing the risk of tourniquets left on after finger
and toe surgery
1 Dec 2009 Lithium Safer lithium therapy
19 Nov 2009 Being open
Being open: Communicating patient safety incidents
with patients, their families and carers
29 Sept 2009 Oxygen Oxygen safety in hospitals
29 July 2009 Catheter insertion
Minimising risks of suprapubic catheter insertion
(adults only)
24June 2009 NHS Number
Risk to patient safety of not using the NHS Number
as the national identifier for all patients
11 June 2009 Glaucoma
Preventing delay to follow-up for patients with
glaucoma
28 May 2009 Mental health
Preventing harm to children from patents with mental
health needs
30 Apr 2009 Urinary catheters
Female urinary catheters causing trauma to adult
males
28 Apr 2009 Throat packs
Reducing the risk of retained throat packs after
surgery
11 Mar 2009 Hip cement
Mitigating surgical risk in patients undergoing hip
arthroplasty for fractures of the proximal femur
19 Feb 2009 Bowel cleansing solutions
Reducing risk of harm from oral bowel cleansing
solutions
09 Dec 2008 Midazolam
Reducing risk of overdose with midazolam injection
in adults
26 Nov 2008 Resuscitation, mental health, learning disability
Resuscitation in mental health and learning disability
settings
12 Nov 2008 Craniotomy, burr holes, neurosurgery Avoiding wrong side burr holes / craniotomy
21 Oct 2008 Hib vaccine, Infanrix, immunisation
Risks of omitting Hib when administering Infanrix-
IPV+Hib
30 Sep 2008 Haemodialysis, water supply
Risks to haemodialysis patients from water supply
(hydrogen peroxide)
11 Aug 2008 Vinca alkaloid, minibag
Using Vinca Alkaloid Minibags (adult/adolescent
units)
28 Jul 2008 Infusions, arterial lines
Problems with infusions and sampling from arterial
lines
19 May 2008 Chest drain, chest tube Risks of chest drain insertion
24 Apr 2008 Intravenous, heparin flush Risks with intravenous heparin flush solutions
22 Jan 2008 Oral anti-cancer medicines
Risks of incorrect dosing of oral anti-cancer
medicines
26 Nov 2007 Paraffin skin products
Fire hazard with paraffin based skin products on
dressings and clothing
10-Sep-2007 Haemorrhage
Emergency support in surgical units: Dealing with
haemorrhage
03 Sep 2007 Injectable amphotericin
Risk of confusion between non-lipid and lipid
formulations of injectable amphotericin
18 Jun 2007 Cytarabine
Risk of confusion between cytarabine and liposomal
cytarabine (Depocyte®)
39
2. Aims and objectives
Given the proliferation of orthopaedic patient safety incidents reported to the NRLS, this is the first
systematic attempt at understanding the aetiology of unsafe care in the specialty.
The aims of this thesis are to:
• understand the opportunities offered by the NRLS to ascertain the frequency, types and
causes of errors in orthopaedic surgery
• develop the risk prediction potential of the system
• offer critical reflections on the role of reporting systems for improving the care received by
orthopaedic patients.
The specific objectives are to explore the following aspects of safety in orthopaedic surgery:
• Critically appraising the roles of reporting systems in understanding the aetiology of
healthcare errors.
• Using the NRLS to understand the frequency and types of errors in orthopaedic surgery.
• Developing a method to prioritise the types of errors likely to cause the greatest harm in the
above specialty, as reported to the NRLS.
• Using examples from the above prioritisation exercise to develop national solutions to
minimising certain types of orthopaedic errors.
• Assessing the feasibility of developing an index of harm which will identify outlier hospitals
that appear to be particularly dangerous for patients receiving orthopaedic care.
• Reflecting on the limitations of the NRLS in better understanding errors from orthopaedic
care and offering solutions to further the delivery of safer orthopaedic care.
3. Experimental studies
The work undertaken focuses on four key studies, set out in Chapter 3, which aim to further the
understanding of errors in orthopaedic surgery through the lens of the NRLS. A conceptual
framework has been used which has been adapted from the one proposed by Donabedian
[Donabedian 2005], as shown in Figure 3.1. Specifically, the three components ofmy framework are:
(i) Understanding the types and frequencies of errors and outcomes in orthopaedic
surgery. In order to learn from errors, I sought to categorise the orthopaedic-related
errors. [Noble Dj 2011] Death, in terms of absolute numbers, being the most severe
category of harm, was explored further to delineate the causes of a sub-set of
preventable deaths.
(ii) Developing research-driven ways to mitigate orthopaedic-related harm. These
were derived from the underlying principles enshrined within the national guidance
suggested in The Seven Steps to Patient Safety, in which it is stipulated that an organisation
must learn from errors and provide solutions to minimise harm resulting from these
errors. [NPSA 2004]
(iii) Assessing the surveillance potential of the NRLS. My aim was to understand the risk
posed by hospitals that carry out orthopaedic surgery. This work built on the concept
behind system-wide outlier analyses or hospital standardised mortality ratios (HSMRs).
As these have come under increasing scrutiny, [van Gestal YR 2012] I sought to
undertake exploratory work and assess whether organisations could be compared at a
systems-level using the NRLS.
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Figure 3.1: Conceptualframeworkfor thesis
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3.1. Study 1: Identifying errors that cause the greatest harm in orthopaedic
surgery
With scientific and technological advances, the practice of orthopaedic surgery has transformed the
lives of millions worldwide. Such successes, however, have a downside; not only is the provision of
comprehensive orthopaedic care becoming a fiscal challenge to policy-makers and funders, concerns
are also being raised about the extent of the associated iatrogenic harm. The NRLS in England and
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Wales is an under-used resource which collects intelligence from reports about healthcare error.
Using methods akin to case-control methodology, I have identified a method of prioritising the areas
of a national database of errors that have the greatest propensity for harm. My findings are
presented using odds ratios (ORs) and 95% confidence intervals (CIs). The largest proportion of
surgical patient safety incidents reported to the NRLS was from the trauma and orthopaedics
specialty; 48,095/163,595 (29.4%). Of those, 14,482/48,095 (30.1%) resulted in iatrogenic harm to
the patient and 71/48,095 (0.15%) resulted in death. The leading types of errors associated with
harm involved the implementation of care and on-going monitoring (OR 5.94, 95% CI 5.53 to 6.38);
self-harming behaviour of patients in hospitals (OR 2.14, 95% CI 1.45 to 3.18); and infection control
(OR 1.91, 95% CI 1.69 to 2.17). I analysed these data to quantify the extent and type of iatrogenic
harm in the specialty, and make suggestions on the way forward. Despite the limitations of such
analyses, it is clear that there are many proven interventions which can improve patient safety and
need to be implemented. Avoidable errors must be prevented, lest we be accused of contravening
our fundamental duty ofprimiim non nocere.
3.1.1. Introduction
The high frequency of medical errors and the associated disease burden resulting from iatrogenic
harm remains an important challenge for healthcare systems globally. [Hurwitz B 2009] Surgical
specialties have been a focus of scrutiny given the large volumes of procedures carried out. More
than 234 million people require surgical treatment every year globally, and more than half of these
occur in developed countries. [Weiser TG 2008] By the sheer numbers of procedures, both for
emergency and elective problems, trauma and orthopaedics as a specialty could be deemed more
'risky', as partly evidenced by the fact that 20% ofwrong site surgery incidents occurred in the
specialty in 2006—2007. [Robinson PM 2009]
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As well as additional morbidity and mortality, there are direct financial implications of unsafe care. A
measure of the problem could be the amount paid out for clinical negligence claims against the
NHS, which stood at approximately £860 million in the financial year 2010/11; a 9% increase from
the previous year. The specialty with the highest number of clinical number claims was orthopaedic
surgery. [NHS Litigation Authority 2011]
In their follow up report to To Err is Human, Crossing theQuality Chasm, the IOM highlighted the poor
use of incident reporting systems, which are necessary to help inform actions to improve patient
safety. PSRSs help us understand the extent and nature of the problems and should lead to the
development of interventions aimed at mitigating against these errors. National databases of errors
have been created in many parts of the world, including now in the US. [Sheikh A 1999, Panesar SS
2009a, Hickner J 2010] These have offered important insights that have helped to shape national
policy, for example, the recognition of the risks of bone cement implantation syndrome associated
with use of cement in hip fracture surgery, and the potential for information technology (IT)-based
interventions to reduce many cases of drug allergy-related morbidity. [Panesar SS 2009b, Cresswell
KM 2008]
The aim of this study was to understand the burden of harm in trauma and orthopaedics using a
cross-sectional methodology. As such, I wanted to ascertain what types of errors are associated with
the greatest degree of harm in orthopaedic patients.
3.1.2. Methods
3.1.2.1. Study design and data collection
Data from the NRLS database were obtained, cleaned and then analysed for all incidents reported in
the specialty of trauma and orthopaedics from January 2009 to December 2009. The domains
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searched were 'acute/general hospital' and 'trauma and orthopaedics' and it was limited to England.
Characteristics of the medical incident such as cause (data element IN011), contributing factor
(IN06), incident type (IN05), work area (IN03), extent of harm (PD09 and PD16), preventability
and mitigating circumstances (PD12 and PD14), staff involved (ST01), and patient characteristics
(PD02 and PD11) were abstracted. There are 16 types of incident categories (IN05), with further
subdivisions. Free-text descriptions of all the PSIs were also abstracted. Harm was defined by the
user's self-report using variable PD16. Level of harm was classified as no harm, low harm (minimal
harm — patient(s) required extra observation or minor treatment), moderate harm (short-term harm
— patient(s) required further treatment, or procedure), severe harm (permanent or long-term harm)
or death. All incidents causing harm (low, moderate, severe and death) were grouped together.
Further details of these categories of harm are given in Panel 1 below.
Pane/ 1: Descriptions of categories ofharm [NPSA. 201 la]
These categories of harm were developed by the NPSA and have been quoted directly.
"No harm:
Impactprevented— any patient safety incident that had the potential to cause harm but was prevented,
resulting in no harm to people receiving NFIS-funded care.
Impact notprevented— any patient safety incident that ran to completion but no harm occurred to
people receiving NHS-funded care.
Low harm: Any patient safety incident that required extra observation or minor treatment and
caused minimal harm, to one or more persons receiving NHS-funded care.
Moderate harm: Any patient safety incident that resulted in a moderate increase in treatment and
which caused significant but not permanent harm, to one or more persons receiving NHS-funded
care.
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Severe harm: Any patient safety incident that appears to have resulted in permanent harm to one or
more persons receiving NHS-funded care.
Death: Any patient safety incident that direcdy resulted in the death of one or more persons
receiving NHS-funded care."
3.1.2.2. Statistical approach
The null hypothesis was that the propensity of harm in all categories was equal. A 'case' was one
where an error resulted in harm. The 'controls' were defined as errors where no harm occurred or
'near-misses.' Errors were clustered into 15 discrete categories called 'incident types'. I sought to
evaluate the degree of association between different types of errors and resultant harm to the
patient. Measures of relative effect express the outcome in one group relative to that in the other.
Two commonly-used methods are the relative risk (RR) and the OR. The OR is the probability that
a particular event will occur, to the probability that it will not occur, and can be any number between
zero and infinity. In gambling, the odds describe the ratio of the size of the potential winnings to the
gambling stake; in healthcare it is the ratio of the number of people with the event to the number
without. Risk is the concept more familiar to patients and health professionals. Risk describes the
probability with which a health outcome (usually an adverse event) will occur. Measures of relative
effect express the outcome in one group relative to that in the other. Hence, the RR is the ratio of
the risk of an event in the two groups, whereas the OR is the ratio of the odds of an event. For
treatments that increase the chances of events, the OR will be larger than the RR, so the tendency
will be to misinterpret the findings in the form of an overestimation of treatment effect, especially
when events are common (with, say, risks of events more than 20). For treatments that reduce the
chances of events, the OR will be smaller than the RR, so that again misinterpretation overestimates
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the effect of treatment. Furthermore, the RR is an easier concept to understand. [Cochrane
Collaboration] A 2x2 table was constructed for each of the categories, as follows (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1:2x2 table to calculate degree ofassociation between category ofpatient safety incident and severity ofharm
Harm No harm Total
Category A A B a + b
All categories -
Category A
C D c + d
Total a + c b + d a + b + c + d
OR — Odds of harm in orthopaedic category A




There were 163, 595 incidents that occurred in all surgical specialties. The largest proportion of
incidents reported to the NRLS was in the specialty of trauma and orthopaedics (48,095/163,595;
29.4%). Of these, 14,482/48,095 (30.1%) resulted in iatrogenic harm to the patient and 71/48,095
(0.15%) resulted in death. There were 155 NHS trusts that reported data to the database; this
number includes all trusts in England and Wales. Aggregate frequencies of harm and examples of
the free-text are shown in Table 3.2. The five statistically significant areas of harm include
implementation of care and on-going monitoring/review (OR = 2.55, 95% CI 2.49 to 2.62), self-
harming behaviour (OR = 1.60, 95% CI 1.30 to 1.96), infection control incidents (OR = 1.51, 95%
CI 1.41 to 1.61), other (OR = 1.31, 95% CI 1.22 to 1.42), and treatment/procedure (OR = 1.23,
95% CI 1.19 to 1.28).
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Implementation of care and
on-going monitoring / review
1194 (2.5%) 2600 (5.4%) "Admitted 28 / 08 / 05 with fracture rightNOF
[neck of femur fracture], veryfrail. In atrial
fibrillation but not confused. No input requestedfrom
medical team. Starvedfor op 30 / 08 1 05 and 31 /
08 / 05. Postponed due to raised INR [international
normalised ratio] . Starved again 01 I 09/ 05.
Anaesthetistpromised to take her although very high risk,
theatrepostponed again at 16.00."
Self-harming behaviour 52 (0.1%) 48 (0.1%) Pt checked at approx 00.00 hrs & appeared settled. Pt
checked again around 01.00 hrs &found lying straight on
back with upper body twisted over to right hand sideface
facingfloor. I [SN [Staff Nurse] ( 1) ] shouted thept
name & no response - turned on the light& calledfor
help . 1 noticed blood on thefloor & when other Staff
Nurse arrived I noticed a cord aroundpt neck attached to
unit on wall. SHO [Senior House Officer] (2)
arrived immediately <& crash team were called. Pts
head was being supported by SHO ( 2 ) & cord cut by
myself<& SN ( 3 ). Ptput onto back (face very blue <&
blood around nose) . CPR [Cardiopulmonary
resuscitation] was commenced with teampresent - this
was unfortunately unsuccessful"
Infection control incident 576 (1.2%) 468 (1.0%) "30.08.06 - Admitted withfracturedNOF, unfitfor
surgery 31.08.06 . 30.09.06 — MRSA [Methicillin-
resistant Staphylococcus aureus] screen completed -
confirmed neg 04.09.06 . 01.09.06 - OP - 13.09 Swab
taken - leakage from wound. 15.09.06 Wound dry and
healed - sutures removed. 18.09.06 ConfirmedMRSA
from wound swab result. 19.09.06 Reviewed by Dr - nil
ordered, wound healed 20.09.06 - wound discharging.
21.09.06 Urine output decreased, wound leaking blood
cultures taken . 23.09.06 Blood cultures confirmed
MRSA bacteraemia. 27.09.06 Pt deceased - cause of
death recorded as renal 2nd to MRSA sepsis. "
Other 603 (1.3%) 392 (0.8%) "On turningpatient it was noted the sacrum <& buttocks
red small break in skin. Grade 2 pressure sore. "
Treatment, procedure 3695 (7.7%) 2091 (4.3%) 'Patient undergoing cemented hemiarthroplasty under
spinal anaesthetic. Shortly after cementing the patient
deteriorated dramatically leading to a cardiac arrestfrom
whichpatientfailed to recover despite cardio pulmonary
resuscitation. Patient certified dead at 10:55 on 01.06.09
>>
Patient accident 12858 (26.7%) 5639 (11.7%) 'Ptfound on floor, hoisted back to bed, dressed skin tear
on R lower leg, SHO reviewed, xray L hip -




117 (0.2%) 46 (0.1%) "G has been restless and trying to climb out ofbed all
night. DID NOTFA 1.1,. At 02:30 approx noticed
that her bed sheets were covered in blood. Leg examined
and sheets changed but no obvious causefor bleeding
observed although the inside ofthe plaster soaked in blood.




1053 (2.2%) 394 (0.8%) "Received request cardfrom B2 requestingpelvis x-rays on
a [Patient name] dob [date of birth] . Thispt was
broughtfrom the ward by aporter. Thispt was identified
and uponfurther questioning it was discovered that thispt
had not had anyproblems with her hip or any operations
on her hip and was in hospital with afractured shoulder.
She did howeverpoint out that there was anotherpt on B2
with the surname who was awaiting hip surgery. Contacted
requesting Dr who stated he hadput the wrong name
sticker on request card. [Patient name] was returned to
ward and a new request card was written."
Medical device / equipment 1231 (2.6%) 423 (0.9%) "Pt was sentfor as her anaesthetic commenced. S / N
[Senior Nurse]am/ ODA [Operating Department
Assistant] went to check the Birmingham Resurfacing
prosthesis and a 50mm head & 56mm cup x 2 were
found to be missing. I had arranged that allprosthesis
should be on a before 9am delivery due to the current level
ofactivity . Pt anaesthetic was stopped whilst the prosthesis
was sourced. The company was contacted and the
prosthesis had been despatched on Friday - but thy were
unable to ascertain where it was. The hospital atX was
contacted and thy were able to supply us. A taxi was
despatched. Pt was sent to recovery and rescheduledfor
when the prosthesis had arrived. On contacting supplies
and the company the order was ordered on and before 9am
on 31st June."
Patient abuse (by staff / third
party)
59 (0.1%) 17 (0.0%) "Whilst accompanying consultant in his ward round, staff
memberfound his manner towardspatient was
inappropriate - saying thefollowing : You should not have
come into this hospital there nothing wrong withyou .
There are morepatients who needyour bedmore thanyou
do . Consultant then proceeded to the husband saying the
same things he said to his wife and thy had a heated
discussion. Approached deputy sister whose in charge that
time, and complaintprocedure wasgiven. Patient in Bed 2






2196 (4.6%) 606 (1.3%) "Handover takenfromA+E [Accident and
Emergency] staffat around 1630 , Handover stated
fracturedNeck offemur and history ofCOPD [Chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease], on home oxygen 2
litres. I contactedA+E minors at 1930 aspatient still
not transfered, and I was wondering ifshe was still coming
to the ward, or ifher condition had changed and she was
going elsewhere. I was told she wasfine, and the delay was
just due to shortage ofporters. Patient arrived on the ward
at about 2000 escorted by staffnurse, transfered onto bed
by colleagues (support workers and student nurse ) as I
was trying to order some bloodsfor anotherpatient on the
computer. TheA+E nurse came to the office to ask ifI
had recieved a handover, I said 1 had recieved one at 1630
and asked had her condition changed, he said it had not.
As soon as he left the ward, my student nurse came to get
me to see thepatient as she was concerned. Thepatient
was in respiratory distress, she was struggling to breathe ,
gaspingfor air through her mouth , her respiratory rate was
30 , her oxygen saturations were 79% , she was
tachycardic 105 and her BP [blood pressure] was
elevatedfrompreviously . EWS [early warning score]
was 4 . HO [House Officer] immediately called and
changed her nasal specs to afacemask. Thepatient was
also in severepain and had not had any analgesia since
1830 inA+E . Sevredolprescribed andgiven, bloodgases
taken , chest x-ray taken , nebulisergiven , SHO called
forfurther advice . Thepatient complained ofabdominal
pain , and wasfound to be in urinary retention , she said
she had notpassed urine since the morning, and had
talked to staff inA+E about it. Catheterised and
drained 600mls straight away ."
Medication 3617 (7.5%) 744 (1.5%) 'Patient admitted with humeral # fo/lowingfalHO / / /
08 . ORIF [open reduction, internal fixation] 11 /
1/08 and revision surgery 18 / 1/08 Patient
prescribed Diclofenac 50 mg tds on admission continuedfor
next 14 days, no GI [gastrointestinal] ulcer
prophylaxisgiven andpatient starvedfor severalperiods of
time. 24 / 1/08patient hadmajor upperGI bleed,
required laparotomyfor oversew bleeding DU [Duodenal
Ulcer] , massive transfusion and ICU [intensive care
unit] admission . No evidence thatNSAID
[Nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs ] prescription
reviewed orGI idcerprophylaxis considered at any stage
before GI bleed despitepatient being in high risk groupfor




1462 (3.0%) 279 (0.6%) "CT [computerised tomography ] scan ofpt left
humerus was booked in standardmanner using EPR
[electronic patient record] system whilst she was
inpatient on Cambridge ward. The request stated she had
apathalogicalfracture ofher left humerus. The CT took
place on 25th Aprilat 9.30am. When thefilms were
reviewed that afternoon it was clear that infact the wrong
patient had been scanned. The radiology depatment were
informed ofthis error via. Unfortunately we are unable to
find out who infact did recieve the CT scan ofher humerus
as there is no way ofidentifying thepersonfrom the images
and clearly there was no clinical indicationfor her to receive
this scan. Asking CT to perform the scan on the correct
patient so that surgery can beplanned, I was informed to




2370 (4.9%) 441 (0.9%0 'Patient waitedmore than 48 hoursfor surgery, unfit 11
days. Diagnosis # NOF."
Documentation (including
electronic & paper records,
identification and drug charts)
2530 (5.3%) 294 (0.6%) 'Pt attended clinicfor reviewpost-op total knee
replacement. Operation note was absent from hermedical
notes."
Total 33613 (69.9%) 14482 (30.1%)
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3.1.4. Discussion
The areas of concern that I have highlighted in my study are not new to the specialty. By far the
largest category of concern is that of implementation of care and on-going monitoring/review [OR
= 2.55 (95% CI 2.49 to 2.62)]. One of the key areas that has been a significant burden of harm is
that of fragility hip fractures; uptake of best practice guidelines released by the Department of
Health has been patchy. [Healey F 2011] Some of the key components to ensure the delivery of best
practice include a reduction in the delay to surgery and involvement of an orthogeriatrician in the
care of patients. Different models of orthogeriatric care have been proposed with the aim of
ensuring an integrated multidisciplinary team approach with evidence-based pathways. Several tools
are now available to mitigate harm associated with poor care of orthopaedic patients: pre- and post¬
operative adjuncts such as better use of orthogeriatric services; early warning scores and trigger tools
to prevent major catastrophes during pre-, intra- and post-operative phases of care; [Gardner-
Thorpe ] 2006] enhanced recovery protocols [Malviya A 2011] for the entire patient journey to
ensure that best practice guidelines are adhered to; and intra-operative tools such as the WHO
surgical checklist. [Haynes AB 2009]
This was a surprising finding and did not ring true; on further enquiry it was not corroborated by
prior research. There was no way of further investigating whether this was a true finding or an
anomalous finding from the NRLS. I therefore sought to map other datasets that could potentially
be used to triangulate this finding. In discussion with orthopaedic colleagues, the most logical
dataset is the National joint Registry (N]R), but this only collects data on elective procedures and
intra-operative outcomes directly associated with hip, knee, ankle, shoulder and elbow replacements.
See Appendix 4 for correspondence with the N]R regarding the unavailability of information on
suicides. Another source of potentially useful data is the Confidential Inquiries which use data from
I Iospital Episode Statistics (HES)'. [National Confidential Inquiry into Suicide and Homicide by
People with Mental Illness 2013] However, this only looks at patients with known mental health
conditions and does not offer any insights on whether these patients were on an orthopaedic ward.
The implications of a lack of being able to triangulate my findings is that, given time and appropriate
resource, an observational study should be carried out to ascertain the frequency of suicides and
deliberate self-harm on orthopaedic wards.
In the interim, several recommendations have been made which place the onus on clinical services
to prioritise suicide prevention and monitoring. [National Confidential Inquiry into Suicide and
Homicide by People with Mental Illness 2013, National Joint Registry] The NPSA has also
published a toolkit on preventing suicides. [NPSA 2009a]
Infection control incidents were also a domain of concern in my analyses [OR = 1.50 (95% CI 1.41
to 1.61)]. PICAIs are known to be the most frequent adverse event that threatens patient safety; the
frequency of these infections ranges from 5.7 and 19.1 per 100 inpatients. Furthermore, HCAIs can
be broken down into surgical site infections (SSIs) (29%), urinary tract infections (24%),
bloodstream infections (19%), healthcare-associated pneumonia (15%) and other infections (13%).
[Allegranzi B 2011] The burden of these avoidable FICAIs is large; further steps are added to the
patient's journey that could include re-operation, extra nursing care and interventions, and more
antibiotics. Fiscally, these factors have a significant bearing on any healthcare system. [NICE 2008]
Pre-operative measures to reduce SSIs include: patient showering and hair removal; patient and staff
theatre wear; movement to and from theatre; nasal decontamination which does not involve routine
use ofmupirocin; mechanical bowel preparation; and antibiotic prophylaxis for specific groups of
patients. Peri-operative measures include: laminar flow operating rooms; body exhaust suits; hand
decontamination; incise drapes, gowns and gloves; antiseptic skin preparation and diathermy; normal
physiological parameters for patients (normal oxygenation, normoglycaemia and normothermia);
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wound irrigation; and dressings and antiseptics before closure. Finally, in the post-operative phase,
use should be made of dressings, post-operative cleaning of surgical site, antibiotic treatment for SSI
and specialist wound care services. [Humphreys FI 2009]
Uncertainties in orthopaedic surgery (e.g. is a cemented hip prosthesis better in a patient?) may have
played a part in the errors that were classified as treatment/procedure-related problems. Surgical
research has been criticised for relying on lower forms of evidence than randomised controlled trials
(RCTs) to aid in clinical decision-making. [Horton R 1996] Several questions remain unanswered.
The optimal treatment of hip fractures is unknown — few RCTs with small sample sizes, and
outcomes with wide CIs will not help to answer this question. [Chua D 1997] Significant progress
has been made to synthesise current evidence on the subject. [Parker MJ 2006] However, larger
collaborative trials are needed and are currently underway to answer some key questions in
orthopaedic surgery. [Bhandari M 2009]
This is the first attempt, to my knowledge, of prioritising areas of harm in the specialty of
orthopaedics and trauma using a PSRS. However, this is only a start and much more needs to be
done, given concerns about the utility of databases to promote safety. The NRLS held details of 158
incidents in 2003, and to date has over seven million incidents reported to it. [PhamJC 2010a]
Paradoxically, despite the large number of incident reports received by the NRLS, reporting systems
have been shown to detect only about 6% of adverse events found by systematic review of records.
[Sari AB-A 2007] Indeed, it has been argued that national reporting systems are of great importance
at identifying rare events, but of limited use in analysing trends or acting as measurements of patient
safety. [Vincent C 2008] It is commendable that several solutions have been provided in the form of
alerts and rapid responses (see section 1.4). However, most of these solutions seem reactive.
[Lansley A 2009]
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At present, the learning from national PSRSs is limited; some of the information is lost in
translation. [Lankshear A 2008] Local systems of risk management opt for root cause analyses to
develop local solutions to mitigate against harm to the patient. National systems rely on patient
safety experts methodically trawling through patient safety incidents by severity and frequency,
thereby leading to the production of quarterly reports, alerts and rapid response solutions. [Panesar
SS 2009a] Such analyses are time-consuming, as the size of the PSRS increases, and may be of
limited value. There is a need for applied epidemiological tools to be created to allow clusters of
harmful incidents to be identified, both by hospital and specialty. Most commentators agree that the
long-term and sustainable solution lies in professional engagement and local efforts. In this regard, I
believe that my analyses offer a snapshot view of healthcare errors in orthopaedic surgery and will be
of interest.
There are some limitations to my methods; owing to missing data, I am unable to definitely assess
the effect of causative factors for errors, including those such as age and experience of doctor.
With the proliferation of incidents being reported to the NRLS, a scientific method of prioritising
incidents reported to it is required; the above method is one such approach. In section 3.3,1 will
demonstrate how the prioritisation exercise has been used to identify four examples of errors in
orthopaedic surgery and propose ways of mitigating against harm in these areas.
3.2. Study2: Undertaking a content analysis approach to delineate the causes
of preventable death
Patient safety incidents can yield valuable information to generate solutions and prevent future cases
of avoidable harm. The aim of this study was to understand the causative factors leading to all
unnecessary deaths in orthopaedics and trauma surgery reported to the NRLS over a four-year
period (2005—2009), using an inductive approach to content analysis. Reports made to the NRLS are
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categorised and stored in the database as free-text data. A search was undertaken to identify the
cases of all-cause mortality in orthopaedic and trauma surgery, and the free-text elements were used
for thematic analysis. Descriptive statistics were calculated based on the incidents reported. This
included presenting the number of times categories of incidents had the same or similar response.
Superordinate and subordinate categories were created. A total of 257 incident reports were
analysed. Four main thematic categories emerged. These were: (1) stages of the surgical journey —
118/191 (62%) of deaths occurred in the post-operative phase; (2) causes of patient deaths — 32%
were related to severe infections; (3) reported quality of medical interventions — 65% of patients
experienced minimal or delayed treatment; (4) skills of healthcare professionals — 44% of deaths had
a failure in non-technical skills. Most complications in orthopaedic surgery can be dealt with
adequately, provided they are anticipated and that risk-reduction strategies are instituted. Surgeons
take pride in the precision of operative techniques; perhaps it is time to enshrine the multimodal
tools available to ensure safer patient care.
3.2.1. Introduction
Flealthcare is a risky business with adequate attention to patient safety being paid only in the last
decade or so. Data from 2008 revealed that approximately 152,017 incidents (15.5%) related to
surgery each quarter and, of these, 32.4% (49,254 incidents) were from orthopaedic and trauma
surgery. [Catchpole I< 2008b] During the same period, 5,258,594 finished consultant episodes
occurred in surgery and, of these, 1,144,520 were in the specialty of orthopaedics. [Hospital Episode
Statistics]
Despite recent attention, patient safety is not a new or a novel concept. In fact, the process of
reviewing clinical outcomes in a standardised fashion began in parallel with the rise of the modern
teaching hospital. The practice was refined through the work of Ernest Amory Codman, a surgeon
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at Massachusetts General Hospital in the early 20th century, who developed the 'end result system'
[Mallon WJ 2000]. He detailed the clinical history and outcomes of each of his patients on a set of
cards and used this information to review adverse events systematically and to categorise their
precedent errors. This was the precursor to the modern day morbidity and mortality (M&M)
meetings in surgery. In tandem with active steps taken to introduce these meetings as part of surgical
training in the US, the Royal College of Surgeons of England demanded each hospital should hold
regular M&M meetings in order to receive recognition for the training of junior surgical staff. [Royal
College of Surgeons of England 1987]. The National Confidential Enquiry into Patient Outcome
and Death (NCEPOD) has focused attention on the importance of identifying deficiencies in
standards of care; in addition, increasing litigation with expensive settlements provided an added
stimulus to avoid problems caused by poor management or negligence. [Buck N 1987] Clearly there
are lessons to be learnt by studying mortality reported to a national database of incidents.
The aim of this study was to understand the causative factors leading to potentially avoidable deaths
(mortality) in orthopaedics and trauma surgery reported to the NRLS over a four-year period (2005—
2009), using a mixed-methods approach. It is anticipated that the analysis of these data will generate
discussion about the utility and value of reporting adverse incidents. More importandy, it will inform
the development of appropriate interventions to reduce avoidable harm.
3.2.2. Methods
3.2.2.1. Study design and data collection
Data from the NRLS database were extracted, cleaned and analysed using SA.S (Version 9) software
(S/3S Institute, Caty NC, USA). The sample included all incidents reported in the specialty of trauma
and orthopaedics between ]anuary 2005 and December 2009. The structure of the NRLS has been
described in section 1.4. The domains searched were 'acute/general hospital' and 'trauma and
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orthopaedies', and the search was limited to England. Cases identified as 'deaths' were selected. Data
were abstracted onto a data collection sheet designed apriori. A thematic analysis was appropriate as
there is limited information on the causes of deaths in orthopaedics and trauma patients. This
process involves categorising data through the development of a thematic framework by identifying
and summarising key themes using an inductive approach.
Data from the NRLS, specifically the free-text elements, were analysed thematically by using the
constant comparative method. [Pope C 2000] Cases and incident reports from the database were
extracted and considered as units of analysis for the present study. Each incident report was
allocated a unique identification number in order to specify which responses corresponded to the
certain unit in the study, and to protect the identities and confidentiality of those involved in the
cases reviewed.
A thematic framework was developed by generating thematic categories to form superordinate
categories that grouped themes together. Subordinate categories were also created that broke themes
down for greater granularity.
In essence, free text was read to identify common and recurrent themes. Items of data were
repeatedly compared from the dataset and categories were defined in relation to each other.
Subsequently, salient issues and key themes emerged. This ensured that themes, differences and
relations between categories were re-examined and confirmed or modified. [Green j 1998] For the
specific method in analysing the data, thematic analysis was used to determine whether there were
certain concepts present in texts or written documents. [Green ] 2009] The purpose of determining
themes and concepts within documentation or texts is to permit the investigator to quantify and
analyse the data such that inferences about the written text may be made. To conduct a thematic
analysis on the text that was recorded from the responses, the responses were coded into
manageable categories on a variety of levels [Cushner F 2010]; this included breaking the responses
down into key components, words, sentences or themes.
Indexing was achieved by coding each line of the free text according to the thematic framework.
Two independent reviewers (junior doctors) undertook the coding (Dr Andrew Carson-Stevens,
University of Cardiff, and myself); in the case of discrepancies, consensus was achieved by direct
discussion and re-definition of categories agreed. The final coding framework applied to the reports
was agreed by the two reviewers. Microsoft Excel was used to organise the themes and trends of the
information generated from the incident reports.
3.2.3. Results
Two hundred and fifty seven (257) incident reports were analysed and subjected to thematic content
analysis. The analysis generated four thematic (superordinate) categories: (1) stages of the surgical
journey; (2) causes of patient deaths; (3) reported quality of medical interventions; (4) skills of
healthcare professionals. Superordinate categories were broken down into subordinate groups, as
shown in Figure 3.2. The mean inter-rater reliability (Kappa) across all categories was 0.74 (SD 0.27).
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Figure 3.2: Thematic analysis ofall-cause mortality
Stages of the Causes of














3.2.3.1. (1) The surgicaljourney
This referred to three distinct phases of the journey that patients underwent when undergoing an
operation: pre-operative, peri-operative and post-operative stages. 191/257 (74.3%) incidents had
enough information to generate thematic analysis in this section. Of these, 118 (61.7%) deaths were
in the post-operative surgical period; 45 (23.5%) were during the pre-operative phase; whilst 28
reported death peri-operatively. The incidents that could not be analysed (66/257, 25.7%) ranged
from brief reports where no phase could be identified as they consisted of a few words (for example
"patientfell" or "bleepedsurgeon, no response'*), to detailed reports which could have occurred in any
phase (for example "patient deteriorated, surgical team alerted and resuscitation commenced").
3.2.3.2. (2) Causes ofpatient deaths
In the examination of the causes of death reflected in the incident reports, 193 incidents revealed 10
causes of patient death, as shown in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Causes ofpatient deaths
Categorical variable Number of incidents Per cent of incidents
Severe infection 62 32.12
Surgical complications 36 18.65
Cardiac arrest 34 17.62
Deteriorating health condition 22 11.40
Undetected signs 15 7.77
Organ failure 8 4.15
Under investigation 5 2.59
Suspected drug overdose 5 2.59
Failed surgery 4 2.07
No medical attention 2 1.04
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There were 10 causes of accidental death identified. Severe infection was consistently indicated as
the leading cause of death. The data in this group were categorised further: Clostridium difficile (C.
cliff; 69.8%), wound infection (12.7%), septic shock (6.3%), blood culture bacteria (2%) and 'other'
infections.
3.2.3.3. (3)Quality ofmedical interventions
Of the 257 reviewed cases, only 126 cases reported the incident in sufficient detail to assess the
quality of the medical intervention that patients received during their admission. Fifty-six per cent
(56%) of these incidents were categorically classified as receiving only minimal medical intervention.
On the other hand, 24/126 (19%) cases indicated that appropriate interventions were not done in a
timely manner, leading to other infections and complications (further details are in Table 3.4).
3.2.3.4. (4) Skills ofhealthcare professionals
A failure of technical skills was identified in 32 cases. An example is given below:
"Patient became unresponsive with no pulse or respiratory effort. Arrest callput out. CPR [Cardiopulmonary
resuscitation] commenced via [ambulatory] bag and cardiac massage. Responsefrom arrest call was 2 staffnurses.
The nurse carrying the arrest bleep informed them that she was ILS [immediate life support] trained but had not
been updatedfor 5years. The [doctor] appeared to be unaware of thefunction and working of the [defibrillator]
machine and spent time trying to work out how to use it. It was suggested to him a number of times that he needed to
secure an airway but he made no response to this. The machine then gave instructions to stand clear andpress shock but
no instructions weregiven by the [doctor] to move. 3 nurses had to ask the [doctor] to wait until everybody was clear.
Switchboard [were] contacted to bleep the on call anaesthetist covering the ward. The anaesthetist who answered said
that he did not cover [general wards] but he did speak to the SHO [senior house officer] [present]. CPR
maintained during this. When the SHO returned he said that the anaesthetist would contact the Consultant
anaesthetist. However no more contact was made. Further shock given by [doctor]. It was suggested to SHO that
patient needed drugs. He stated he needed to wait as he had shocked thepatient then he requested adrenaline andgave
it. It wasfelt there was no support or anyone at the arrest with enough experience to co-ordinate the arrest. It wasfelt
that someone who was competent in ACS [advanced life support] needed to ensure a co-ordinated event."
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Table3.4:Report dqualityfmedicalinterven ions Categorical VariableExample*
Numberof Incidentsto Offerthis Experience
%of Incidents toOffer this Experience
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The second sub-category identified here was non-technical skills for surgeons (NOTSS). These were
any incident reports that highlighted failures in "situational awareness, communication and teamwork,
leadership and decision-making"'' [Yule S 2006],
3.2.4. Discussion
This is the first attempt to increase our knowledge and understanding of iatrogenic harm leading to
mortality for the speciality of orthopaedics and trauma using a PSRS. However, this is only a start
and much more needs to be done, given concerns about the utility of databases to promote safety.
Thematic analysis is one way to analyse qualitative information. [Taylor Sj 1984] My approach has
opted for themes not explored by other groups studying patient safety in orthopaedics: stages of the
surgical journey, causality of iatrogenic harm leading to mortality, quality of medical interventions
and skills of the healthcare professionals. [Wong DA 2009]
I have shown that almost three-quarters of the deaths in my study occurred outside the pre¬
operative phase. Similar findings were reported in a recent study by Cushner and colleagues that
revealed that majority of the complications seen in patients undergoing arthroplasty of the hip or
knee occur during the peri-operative (e.g. bleeding) and early post-operative period (e.g. deep vein
thrombosis, wound infection, pneumonia). [Cushner F 2010] Several tools are now available to
mitigate harm associated with poor care of orthopaedic patients, such as: pre- and post-operative
adjuncts such as better use of orthogeriatric services [National Clinical Guideline Centre]; early
warning scores and trigger tools to prevent major catastrophes during pre-, intra- and post-operative
phases of care [Gardner-Thorpe J 2006]; enhanced recovery protocols [Malviya A 2011] for the
entire patient journey to ensure that best practice guidelines are adhered to; and intra-operative tools
such as the WHO surgical checklist. [Haynes AB 2009] Yet we know that in some settings, such as
those found in England, uptake of these initiatives has been patchy. [Department of Health 2010a]
A more concerted effort will have to be made by professional organisations to ensure that their
members adhere to best practice guidelines to ensure safer care. The revalidation of healthcare
professionals in the UK should also include domains that reflect the individual practitioner's use of
patient safety tools.
In my study, C. diffwas frequently noted as a causative agent for mortality. This is unsurprising as
the incidence and severity of C. diff-associated diarrhoea has increased, [Wilcox MH 1996, Archibald
MK 2004] in part due to antibiotic regimes that include cephalosporins, and also the demographics
of the patients, who tend to be more elderly. [Al-ObaydiW 2010] Greater collaboration between
orthopaedic and microbiology departments should occur to ensure that local protocols are adhered
to. Furthermore, HCAIs are known to be the most frequent adverse events that threaten patient
safety; as cited in the literature and within my study. The prevalence of these infections ranges from
5.7 and 19.1 per 100 inpatients. The burden of these avoidable HCAIs is large; further steps are
added to the patient's journey that could include re-operation, extra nursing care and interventions,
and further drugs. Fiscally, these factors have a significant bearing on any healthcare system. [NICE
2008]
In orthopaedic surgery, numerous attempts have been made to reduce SSIs in the operating theatre,
including the use of peri-operative antibiotics, laminar flow operating rooms, body exhaust suits,
multiple instrument trays and reduction of intra-operative operation room traffic. [Hill C 1981,
Lipsett PA 2008, Der Tavitan } 2003, Mangram AJ 1999] Hand hygiene remains a key component in
any infection prevention strategy. For many years, the traditional surgical scrub where the surgeon
ensures that hands, nails and parts of the forearm are lathered and scrubbed has been standard
practice. However, surgeons themselves accept that their practice, both in the operating theatre and
outside, has often been suboptimal; 90% compliance is not good enough. [Gawande A 2004] Some
innovative solutions to the problem of SSIs include enhanced infection control initiatives [Schelenz
S 2005] and multimodal quality improvement initiatives such as care bundles. [Pronovost P 2006]
My study highlights that almost half of all the deaths had elements of poor medical interventions.
The highly-specialist nature of orthopaedic surgery means that surgeons are not always up-to-date or
competent to deal with complex medical conditions which many patients, especially the elderly,
present with. For example, it was suggested over 20 years ago that elderly patients undergoing
orthopaedic surgery could benefit from input by geriatricians, owing to their comorbidities, frailty
and reduction in independence. [Gilchrist WJ 1988, Kennie DC 1988, Devas MB 1974] It is only
recently, however, that there has been heightened political profiling, through initiatives such as the
National Hip Fracture Database (NHFD), the Royal College of Physicians' Audit of Falls and Bone
Flealth, the Department of Health's 'Commissioning Toolkit' and NICE's hip fracture guideline.
[NHFD 2009, Department of Flealth 2009, NICE 2009] Furthermore, hip fracture is included in the
'Best Practice Tariff, which will financially reward units which include an orthogeriatrician in leading
patient care. [Department of Health 2010a] There should be no excuse for unavoidable deaths due
to poor medical management which falls outside the realm of the orthopaedic surgeon's
armamentarium.
One of the other key findings of this study was the large burden of a lack of non-technical skills,
which account for a significant proportion of iatrogenic harm. Almost 43% of all the deaths could
be attributed to a lack of situational awareness, communication, teamwork and decision-making. It
has been shown that most healthcare incidents can be attributed to failures in non-technical skills
rather than technical ones. [Bogner M 2004] Training in orthopaedic surgery has generally focused
on clinical knowledge and expertise, including technical skills. There have been some attempts at
introducing non-technical skills training through various organisations such as the Royal Colleges.
[Yule S 2006] However, greater effort is required to integrate non-technical skills into the
educational activities of orthopaedic trainee doctors. Perhaps the momentum gained through the
WHO surgical checklist, which aims to create well-functioning teams that improve the workings of
the orthopaedic surgeon, will drive this agenda forward. Better teamwork and communication in
operating theatres improves outcomes. Teamwork is definable and measurable, and can be improved
through formal structured communication, such as checklists. Healthcare, and surgery in particular,
is a team game, yet we have ignored the experiences of other high-risk industries, to our patients'
cost. The WHO checklist and associated briefings and de-briefings are a major step forward in our
approach to delivering the safe, reliable care we would want for our family, to all our patients.
[NPSA 2009b]
3.2.4.1. Umitations ofthe study and clinical relevance
There were limitations to the coding system, both in terms of the dataset; some records had greater
detail provided than others and the incompleteness of the others which could have affected the
coding and there was no opportunity to verify the accuracy of the contents of the reports. A specific
limitation of the coding of the incidents are that the process was undertaken by two clinical health
services researchers who were also junior doctors. In the case of both doctors, we reviewed the
reports of errors with a lens unique to the doctor's perspective and these remain intangible and
undocumented as they rely upon previous clinical experience and knowledge. [Strauss A 1990]
[Williams M 1996] [Butler T 1998] Even though we constantly questioned our own assumptions and
strived to provide replicable conclusions. [Plummer K 2001]
Reflecting critically, I would have in hindsight, opted to have a more multi-disciplinary team
involved in the coding of incidents. Some incidents had multiple levels of error type, causality and
preventability that could be applied. An overarching-category was chosen for each incident report;
secondary or tertiary levels of code were not applied as the purpose of this undertaking was to
understand the causative factors leading to potentially avoidable deaths (mortality) in the
orthopaedics and trauma incidents reported to the NRLS. In future, secondary and tertiary coding
will be applied to ensure greater granularity of findings can be provided. Another key limitation of
this study is the inability to track anonymised incident reports back to their reporting hospitals so
that further information can be obtained that would enable a deeper understanding of the error
reports, which would have further enhanced my analysis. Other frequently-cited issues with the free-
text reports include those related to reporting and hindsight. [Catchpole K 2009]
3.2.4.2. Conclusions
Iatrogenic harm in trauma and orthopaedic surgery is an important issue and we need a multi-
pronged strategy to address it. In addition, to better study the problem by building research capacity
in the area, we need to act on known and proven interventions for delivering safer care; encourage
better clinical leadership; promote the use of patient safety indicators as part of quality accounts for
orthopaedic surgeons within hospitals; and showcase examples of best practice that use quality
improvement and patient safety metrics.
3.3. Study 3: Using four examples as primers for ways to minimise harm
3.3.1. Introduction
Unlike the method currently deployed with the NRLS, whereby clinical reviewers identify cases of
severe harm and death, and make a decision on whether to present them to the weekly response
meeting, the methods used in Study 1 (section 3.1) help to priortise, in a scientific manner, areas
where efforts must be focused to better understand the causality of errors in orthopaedic surgery.
The study on the 257 deaths also helped to corroborate the areas picked for further query. In
reviewing the deaths, almost half were related to poor quality of medical interventions.
3.3.2. Methods
Once the top categories of patient safety incidents were identified, 100 random incidents were
drawn from each category and the free text was reviewed to assess suitability for presentation to the
weekly response meeting. A committee decision was made on whether to pursue the proposed
topics; and national RRRs were developed for some of these. This is the first time that a scientific
method was used for priority setting and it is encouraging to note that my method has led to the
development of key national outputs (alerts). Different timeframes were used when searching for
incidents depending upon the urgency with which national alerts had to be produced. The four
examples that underwent formal scoping and development of solutions are shown in Table 3.5:
Table 3.5: Examples ofdevelopment ofRapid Response Rxports





Other "Fatient admitted for bilateral toe surgery.
Tourniquet left on right toe. Re-admitted to
hospital two days later complaining of no sensation






"'Admitted 4 / 6 / 07, likely delaygetting to
theatrefor repair offractured left neck ofemur, no
list space availablefor 5-6 days. . "








"Patient having cemented hip prosthesis insertedfor
fractured neck offemur. Cement inserted and
prosthesis being hammered into place whenpatient
became bradycardias 40 / min. Unresponsive to
atropine. Loss ofpalpablepulse withpulseless
electrical activity, cardiac arrest. Cardiopulmonary
resuscitation commenced and continuedfor 20
minutes and no response to treatment. Patient
died"; "Duringprocedure when introduction of
cement thepatients condition deteriorated. Patient
died at 21:10"; 'Patient was having an operation
for a right cemented [name ofprosthesis]. Patient
went into asystole when cementput into hipjoint".
6 Yes
Patient accident 'Patient admitted to [ward a]from [ward b] - on
transfer to wardpatient hadpain in R hip and
nursing assistant noticed R leg was shorter and
rotated— staffnurse informed, on call doctor
informed x-ray requested and shows that hip is
dislocated, notes statepatientfell [three days
earlier]. Manipulation on ward unsuccessful so
patient is now for high risk surgery."
7 Yes
I carefully reviewed the literature on each topic and worked with internal experts at the NPSA and
external specialists to formulate recommendations for the alerts.
3.3.3. Example 1: Digital tourniquets
Tourniquets are used in hand and foot surgery because of the need for a bloodless field to allow for
careful dissection. They are used in a range of settings, such as operating theatres, emergency
departments, community sites (for example, for minor surgery in podiatry clinics). Although rare,
complications can lead to serious harm including, at worst, irreversible ischemia. [Nairn S 2008]
3.3.3.1. Data miningfrom the NRLS
Based on work undertaken by my novel method in Study 1 (section 3.1), one type of incident that
warranted further scrutiny was that involving digital tourniquets; careful trawling through the
incidents between August 2005 and November 2009 revealed that healthcare staff in England and
Wales had reported 15 serious incidents in which tourniquets had been left on fingers or toes by
mistake. Ten patients needed further surgery and two incidents resulted in amputation. At least six of
the incidents related to surgical gloves being used as tourniquets. Fourteen litigation claims relating
to tourniquets were also reported in this period. The degrees of harm are shown in
Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Classification ofharmfrom tourniquet incidents
Classification of harm Number of incidents
Amputation required 2
Further treatment required 8
Not known 5
Total 15
Table 3.7: Type oftourniquet used in incidents




Table 3.8: Where tourniquet incidents occurred





Examples of tourniquet incidents (direct quotes from the NRLS database):
"Patient had termination oftip of right ring finger. He attendedplastic dressing clinkfor routinefollow up. When the
dressing was removed his ringfinger was necrotic and still had what looked like glove tourniquet in situ. Explained to
patient he will require amputation " (Severe harm)
"Finger tourniquet left insitufor 14 daysfollowing minor surgery ofwound debridementpulp left middlefinger.
Patient required amputation offinger. Initial operation peformed on 05.07.06, tourniquet discovered on 18.07.06
and amputation of the left middlefinger carried out on 19.07.06" (Severe harm)
'Whilst changing dressing tofeet. S / N noticed? band around 2nd toe Hfoot. (Pt had surgery 5/7 ago to remove
toe nails) Consultant clinic" (No harm)
'Patient had termination oftip ofright ring finger. He attendedplastic dressing clinicfor routinefollow up. When the
dressing was removed, his ringfinger was necrotic and still had what looked like aglove tourniquet in situ. Explained
topatient he will require amputation."
Although the numbers of patients affected are relatively small, a degree of harm that requires
amputation of the affected digit or further surgical treatment is very serious.
3.3.3.2. NHS Hiligation Authority data
There were 14 relevant cases in the NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA) database for the period 1
January 2004 to 23 November 2009, all of which resulted in financial settlements.
Examples of incidents reported to the NHSLA (direct quotes from the NHSLA):
'Patient admittedfor bilateral toe surgery. Tourniquet left on right toe. Re-admitted to hospital two days later complaining of
no sensation in right toe. Tourniquet removed and toe black. Further surgey required."
'Failure to remove tourniquet resulting in amputation of right big toe. "
'Failure to remove tourniquetfollowing removal ofcystfrom littlefinger right hand. Patient returned to minor casualty
17/4/04 - tourniquetfound and removed -patient referred to hand surgeons. "
3.3.3.3. Review ofthe literature
Digital tourniquets have been condemned because of the reported occurrence of intimal damage,
vascular thrombosis, neuropraxia [Dove AF 1982] and necrosis of fingers [Saw JA 1985] leading to
amputations due, in large part, to the high pressures generated directly beneath the tourniquet. [Love
BR 1979] In addition, two published case reports record amputations after retained tourniquets on
fingers and toes. [De Boer HL 2007, Haas F 1999]
Changes in peripheral nerves secondary to prolonged or excessive pressure beneath and distal to the
site of compression have been documented in experimental animals at cuff pressures between 500
and 1000mm of Fig. [Tountas CP 1986] Although, in general, digital tourniquets are relatively safe, it
has been suggested that the complication rate can be high. [Saw ]A 1985, Tountas CP 1986]
Several studies have assessed pressures and pain perception in patients who have digital tourniquets
used. The most definitive study compared a rolled rubber glove, commercial rubber finger
tourniquet band and a urinary catheter. The authors concluded that the mean and range of pressures
were highest and most variable with the catheter tourniquet, whereas the pressures of the band
tourniquet came between the rubber glove fingerstall and the catheter.
Correspondingly, the visual analogue scale showed high scores with the catheter tourniquet and low
scores with the rubber glove tourniquet. They went on further to suggest that rubber glove
fingerstall digital tourniquets, when compared with the other two tourniquets, generate the lowest
pressures with less variability and lowest pain score in a visual analogue scale, thereby reducing the
potential risk of neurovascular complications. I feel that the use of the catheter tourniquet method
on the finger, as proposed by Lubahn [1985], should be avoided in view of the extreme and variable
pressures generated. Other studies had methodological shortcomings, including the use of indirect
pressure measuring techniques [Hixson FP 1986, Lubahn ]D 1985], and small [Hixson FP 1986,
Lubahn JD 1985, Saw JA 1985] and unrepresentative samples. [Saw ]A 1985]
33.3.4. Problems identified by the NPSA
Little good quality evidence was found to support different tourniquet techniques. The use of
surgical gloves as tourniquets seems to be widespread, as they are easily available and cheap, carry a
low risk of infection, and are considered effective in achieving haemostasis. This practice is still
recommended in manuals for emergency trainees and others. [King C 2008] But gloves are normally
flesh-coloured and may inadvertently be left on. Some clinicians have advocated use of coloured
gloves, [Tucker S 2002] and a widely-cited paper by Smith and colleagues describes a modified
technique using a glove and an artery clip. [Smith IM 2002] However, risks still remain (as
acknowledged by Smith and colleagues) with this or any other 'home-made' device, for example, the
risk of neuropraxia as pressure is applied in a very narrow area. The broad safety principle is that
devices should be used for their intended purpose only. [Medicine and Plealthcare Products
Regulatory Agency (MFIRA) 2010]
3.3.3.5. Next steps
The NPSA issued an RRR on the risks of tourniquets left on fingers and toes in December 2009.
[NPSA 2009b] This is shown in Appendix 5. In the absence of evidence, the NPSA and the Royal
College ofSurgeons consulted clinical experts to identify key actions to make practice safer:
1. Use only tourniquets with the CE marking (which indicates conformitywith the European
Union's safety standards), which are labelled and/or are brightly-coloured to maximise
visibility. Do not use gloves as tourniquets.
2. Reconcile the number of tourniquets through swab counting procedures, and record the
on/off time of tourniquets.
3. Consider including tourniquets as part of the surgical safety checklist (tourniquet removal at
'sign out' stage).
4. Once the tourniquet has been removed, check for adequate perfusion of finger or toe.
5. Ensure staff and patients know to look for later signs of tissue ischemia, necrosis and
gangrene (skin discoloration or a pulseless, painful, paralysed, paraesthetic or cold digit).
Many items have been used as tourniquets, including catheters, elastic bands and surgical gloves
(either whole or finger only, sometime with additions, for example, artery clips or the red string used
for bundling up of gauze swabs). Some of these techniques may be safer than others, but little high-
quality evidence exists. However, the wide range of practice is in itselfof interest and suggests the
need for evidence-based guidelines. Unfortunately, some groups believe that the surgeon decides on
the type of tourniquet used and ensures that the time the finger tourniquet is applied and released is
documented, and fundamentally the need for vigilance remains with the surgeon. [Barai KP 2010]
3.3.3.6. Conclusion
Early information from the manufacturers currently producing tourniquets with the CE marking
shows a 140% increase in purchasing in the three months after the issue of the RRR, compared with
a similar period before issue.
3.3.3.7. Effectiveness of the alert
The alert [NPSA 2009b] was released on 9 December 2009 and NHS trusts had until 9 ]une 2010 to
implement recommendations from the document. To date, 277/389 (71%) trusts have indicated
compliance; 108/389 (28%) felt they did not need to comply; 3/389 (0.8%) were still implementing
the alert; and 1/389 (0.2%) had not acknowledged the alert. Until July 2012, no cases of severe
harm/death associated with the misuse of digital tourniquets have been reported. It is impossible to
ascertain the role of under-reporting.
3.3.4. Example 2: Answering unanswered questions in a specialty: delay to hip surgery
Hip surgery is a usually a life-altering event which, when done well, results in a significant
improvement to the patient's quality of life. For many previously fit people, hip fracture means the
loss of full mobility and, for the particularly frail, a loss of their way of living. This condition must be
taken seriously — the disease is complicated, results in significant morbidity and mortality, and
involves the interaction of many healthcare professionals, each ofwhom must work particularly hard
to restore the patient's pre-morbid state. The mortality of hip fracture remains significantly high, at
around 20%, of which only one-third of this mortality can be attributed to the fracture. Parker M]
1991]
The burden of hip fracture surgery remains onerous. Just under a quarter of a million (220,000) hip
fractures occur every year in the US, representing an annual cost of $9 billion to the healthcare
system. [Ray NF 1997] In the UK, the care of patients with hip fracture is equally high. The average
cost of a patient undergoing surgery for hip fracture was estimated as £12,163. The total cost to
society has been estimated to be £726 million per annum. Most of this cost is attributable to hospital
and social care. [University ofYork]
Significant controversies remain over the timing of hip fracture surgery. Proponents of early
stabilisation believe that complications from bed rest (i.e. thromboembolism, pressure ulcers and
urinary tract infections) can be reduced; however, others support a surgical delay to allow
optimisation of a patient's pre-operative medical status. [Bhandari M 2004]
National guidelines do not provide any clarity either. The Scottish Intercollegiate Guidelines
Network (SIGN) guidelines [SIGN 2009] stress that surgery should be performed as soon as the
medical condition of the patient is stable. [Bredahl C 1992, Holt EM 1994] They found no evidence
for the efficacy of early surgery (<48 hours), owing to the heterogeneity of the observational studies.
[Grimes JP 2002, Siegmeth AW 2005] However, 97% of medically-fit patients went to theatre within
the 24 hours target. [SIGN 2009] The Royal College of Physicians (London) concluded that there
was great variability in the care offered to patients with hip fracture and an unacceptable 31% had
their operations delayed beyond the 48-hour target. Indeed, they advocate the treatment of hip
fractures within 24 hours. [BOA 2007] The British Orthopaedic Association (BOA), through the
NHFD, recommend that all patients with a hip fracture should be operated on within 48 hours, and
during normal working hours. [BOA 2007]
NCEPOD stated in 1997 that: "There should be sufficient, fully staffed, daytime theatre and recoveryfacilities to
ensure that no patient requiring an urgent operation waitsfor more than 24 hours oncefit for surgery. This includes
weekends". [NCEPOD 1997] An Audit Commission report of 2001 stated that the percentage of
patients having their operations within 24 hours had fallen from 50% to 35%, and those having
surgery within 48 hours had fallen from 83% to 69%. [Audit Commission 2001] Data from the
NHFD showed that out-of-hours operating had dropped from 14% to 4%. [NFIFD 2009]
Based on work undertaken by my novel method in Study 1 (section 3.1), one type of incident that
warranted further scrutiny was that involving delay to hip surgery; and all orthopaedic and trauma
incidents reported to the NRLS from January 2005 to December 2009 were reviewed. Although
most of the PSIs were of low harm, as shown in Table 3.9, this issue warrants an answer.
Table 3.9: Degree ofharm in incidents related to delay to hipfracture surgery




No harm 7,901 86
Low harm 669 7
Moderate harm 504 5
Severe harm 99 1
Death 20 0
Total 9,193 100
An example of an incident from each category of harm is given below:
Examples of PSIs related to delay to hip fracture surgery (direct quotes from the NRLS
database
No harm: "Patient waited more than 48 hoursfor surgery. 12 days. Diagnosis # Femur"
Low harm: 'Pt was admitted on 02 / 05 / 07 withfracture left neck femur with surgery for thefollowing day. Every
day Pt has been starved in preparationfor her operation only to be told each day that surgery has been cancelled. This has
occurredfour times resulting in her husband who relies heavily on her due to hispoor vision andpoor hearing, also his
inability to cook . Pt Daughter has voiced her concerns at her, mothers reduced chances ofmaking afull recovery due to the
delay in operating . The Family at there request have spoken to NP and voiced there concerns , theyplan to put in an
official complaint. Leafletsgiven to Daughter and advice given re whom to contact. Pt has spoken with the on call
Manager and Executives andplans have been made to operate between 09.00 to 12md tomorrow with thepromise ofan
extra theatre being opened should emergency Pt take operating time. ."
Moderate harm: "Admitted 4 / 6 I 07, likely delay getting to theatrefor repair offractured left neck offemur, no list
space availablefor 5-6 days. . "
Severe harm: 'Pt admitted viaA&E on 9th March . Dr seeingpatient did not see anyfracture on thepatient Left hip
X-ray where she hadpain . This is not surprising as this is an undisplacedfracture which is difficultfor ajunior doctor to
see. Patient admitted under the elderly care team. Fracture not diagnosed until 15th March i.e. 6 day delay whenX ray
repeated andfracture now visible as moved. The X-ray was not reported by the radiology department until 26th March
which is an unacceptable amount of time and removes the effective safety net we have inA&E exactlyfor such
circumstances. The recomended turnaround timefor reportingX - rays is 48 hours and would have resulted in a speedier
outcomefor the correct diagnosis to be reached if this had been the case . ."
Death: "Admitted 28 I 08 / 05 with fracture right NOF, veryfrail. InAF but not confused. Starvedfor op 30
/ 08 / 05 and 31 / 08 / 05 . Postponed due to INR . Starved again 01 / 09 / 05. Anaesthetistpromised to take
her although very high risk , theatre postponed again at 16.00 . "
Further review of the database revealed a sophisticated level of reporting by healthcare professionals
who were genuinely concerned about the duration of stay prior to the repair of the hip fracture (n =
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Figure 3.3: Number ofincidents involving delays in treatment offracture
The evidence for the repair of hip fractures remains controversial. Since no randomised trials exist,
current evidence is based on observational data. Observational datasets are limited when baseline
differences between groups arise. The largest observational study had 1,178 patients who had
surgical repair of their hip fracture. Of these, 398 (33.8%) had surgery within 24 hours, and 780
(66.2%) had later surgery. Data on death and functional status at six months were available for 94%
of the patients. The overall unadjusted mortality was 17.5% at six months. Early surgery was not
associated with a decreased risk of death (hazard ratio [HR] 0.75, 95% CI 0.52 to 1.08) or ofmajor
post-operative complications (HR 0.55, 95% CI 0.24 to 1.1). [Orosz GM 2004] However, it is worth
noting that 10 baseline characteristics differed between the two patient groups, although the authors
adjusted for them in their analysis. The analysis, however, cannot exclude a clinically important
reduction in mortality with early surgery (up to 48%). Although the 95% CI crosses equivalence, the
current data support anywhere from a 1% to a 50% reduction in mortality with 86% confidence.
The definition of early surgery (in the first 24 hours after hospital arrival) also seems somewhat
arbitrary. Despite the authors' assertion that six months of follow-up was sufficient, recovery
following hip fractures may extend to one year. In a recent study involving 651 patients with hip
fractures, early surgery (within 48 hours) significantly reduced the risk of death by 39% (95% CI 10
to 58) at one year. Furthermore, operating in less than 24 hours reduced the pain experienced by
patients and the length of stay in the hospital (P<0.01). [Bhandari M 2004]
A study conducted in Germany used hospital data for 2,916 hip fracture patients. It compared
groups with short (<12hrs), medium (>12 to <36 hrs) and long (>36 hrs) time-to-surgery and
revealed only some non-significant associations with certain complications such as post-operative
bleeding requiring treatment (early surgery patients) and urinary tract infections (delayed surgery
patients). Both unadjusted rates of one year all-cause mortality (between 18.1% and 20.5%), and the
multivariate-adjusted FIRs (HR for time-to-surgery: 1.04; P=0.55), showed no association between
mortality and time-to-surgery. [Smektala R 2008]
A small study (n=182 patients) found that delaying surgery by even six hours significantly increases
the one year mortality. [Dorotka R 2003]
Another study suggests that delay to surgery was not a significant predictor of in-hospital mortality.
However, a delay ofmore than 24 hours was a significant predictor of a minor medical
complications (OR 1.53, 95% CI 1.05 to 2.22), while a delay ofmore than 48 hours was associated
with an increased risk of a major medical complications (OR 2.21, 95% CI 1.01 to 4.34), a minor
medical complication (OR 2.27, 95% CI 1.38 to 3.72) and of pressure sores (OR 2.29, 95% CI 1.19
to 4.40). It was therefore concluded by the authors that patients with a fracture of the hip should
have surgery early to lessen the time to acute care hospital discharge and to minimise the risk of
complications. [Lefaivre KA 2009] Similarly, another observational study of 1,320 patients found
that a time to surgery of greater than two days had a two-fold increase in 30-day mortality after
adjusting for age, gender and comorbidity (OR=1.99, 95% CI 1.06 to 3.72). In a second model, also
including American Society of Anesthesiologists (ASA) score, the OR decreased to 1.84 (95% CI
0.97 to 3.49). Patients with a hip fracture should have surgery within two days from admission in
order to reduce 30-day mortality. [Carretta E 2010] Other studies have reported similar ORs for a
delay of greater than two days: the HR of one-year mortality for postponing surgery beyond 48
hours was 1.63 (95% CI 1.11 to 2.40). [Gdalevich M 2004] In another study (n=49), patients who
underwent early surgical repair (within 48 hours) had fewer post-operative complications (14.7%, as
compared with 33.3% in the group undergoing surgery 48 hours after fracture). [Sircar P 2007]
All patients who have an episode of care in an NHS hospital become part of the HES database.
Over a three-year period (2001 to 2004), there were 129,522 admissions for fractured neck of femur
in 151 trusts, with 18,508 deaths in hospital (14.3%). Delay in operation was associated with an
increased risk of death in hospital, which was reduced but persisted after adjustment for
comorbidity. For all deaths in hospital, the OR for more than one day's delay, relative to one day or
less, was 1.27 (95% CI 1.23 to 1.32) after adjustment for comorbidity. The proportion with more
than two days' delay ranged from 1.1% to 62.4% between trusts. If death rates in patients with a
maximum of one day's delay had been repeated throughout all 151 trusts in this study, there would
have been an average of 581 (478 to 683) fewer total deaths per year (9.4% of the total). There was
little evidence of an association between delay and emergency readmission. [Bottle A 2006]
Another potential confounding factor in the relationship between delay in hip fracture surgery and
outcome is whether the surgery should be performed during working hours, which may lead to an
inevitable delay, or outside working hours. A retrospective analysis of 165 patients who were
operated on outside working hours and 123 who were operated on during working hours (08.00 to
17.00) was undertaken. There was no difference in the rate of early complications (outside working
hours 33% versus working hours 33%, p = 0.91) or total complications during follow-up (outside
working hours 40% versus working hours 41%, p = 0.91). Both in-hospital mortality (outside
working hours 12% versus working hours 11%, p = 0.97) and mortality after one year (outside
working hours 29% versus working hours 27%, p = 0.67) were comparable. Adjustment for possible
confounders by multivariate logistic regression analysis revealed no increased risk of complications
when patients were operated on outside working hours. [Bosma E 2010]
Physicians should aim for early operative fixation of hip fractures to reduce patients' pain and length
of hospital stay. Larger studies will be needed to address whether early surgery reduces mortality and
the incidence ofmajor post-operative complications.
Extracts from reported incidents — post-operative complications
'Whilst drilling left shoulder - drill bit broke unable to retrievefrompatient."
"During a left total elbow replacement, while drilling down the ulna, part of one of the drills on the loan kitfrom biomet
broke off. It was veryfar down the cannal ofthe ulna and surgeon was unable to reach the drill bit with out causing damage
and affecting the elbow replacement. Therefore it was left inside thepatient. The company rep waspresent and was asked to
check the shelf life of the kit and consulted with Mr consultant before continuing the case . ."
"Patient underwent total knee replacement on 9 / 4 / 09 without notable complication . On check x-ray broken drill bit
left in knee , operating surgeon and scrub nurse had not noted the broken end of the drillbit at the time ofsurgery . ."
"Consultant was drilling inside the upper section of the mouth to make holes in the bonefor a bone craft. On giving the drill
back to staffnurses it was noted that the top of the drill bit was missing, approximately 2cm long. Mouth was looked in,
drapes and swabs were checked, x-ray taken , airway looked at, no drill bitfound. Xray advised and to be vigilant of
finding the metal. ."
3.3.5. Example 3: The story of hip cement
In 1990, 1.3 million hip fractures occurred globally. Predictions are that numbers will rise to
anywhere between 7.3 and 21.3 million by 2050. [Gullberg B 1997] Mortality after a hip fracture
remains substantial, being 11—23% at six months and rising to 22—29% at 12 months post-injury.
[Haleem S 2008] Total hip replacement and hemiarthroplasty are the main treatment options for
displaced femoral neck fractures, with broadly similar outcomes for both procedures. What is less
clear, however, is whether these arthroplasties should be cemented, uncemented, or hybrid.
Although to some extent an old issue, this issue has attracted renewed interest of late because of the
possible risk of the potentially catastrophic bone cement implantation syndrome in those who have
undergone cementing procedures. [Donaldson A] 2009]
In the UK, the use of cement for total hip arthroplasty and subsequently hemiarthroplasty was
heralded by a sentinel publication from one of the leading orthopaedic surgeons of the century, Sir
John Charnley. [Gomez PF 2005] Prior to this, orthopaedic surgeons had borrowed from the dental
community a form of acrylic cement suitable for surgery. Surgeons in Copenhagen and New York
had used bone cement to attach plastic cups to femoral heads and secure a femoral prosthesis,
respectively. [Charnley ) 1960] Sir ]ohn Charnley was responsible for noting that the points of direct
contact between an implant and bone requisite for a tight fit were the points where the bone would
absorb and leave the implant inadequately supported. Furthermore, he proposed that cement acted
as a 'grout', not as glue, so that fixation was achieved by interlocking and not by adhesion. The
cement was forced into all available interstices, so the weight of the body was dispersed over a large
area of bone. He believed that bold and generous use of cement improved fixation by a factor of
200. Heat generated during polymerisation was absorbed by the metal prosthesis, which acted as a
heat sink. [Gomez PF 2005] It is worth noting that this leading professor of orthopaedic surgery
once stated in response to total hip arthroplasty: "The cart has beenput before the horse; the artificialjoint
has been made and used, and now we are trying tofind out how and why itfails". [Charnley J 1956]
It is a well-known fact that the literature in orthopaedic surgery is of variable quality. One might
argue that orthopaedic surgery, like most branches of surgery, lacks RCTs and hence a greater
number ofmeta-analyses tend to be of observational studies that are of variable quality. The number
ofmeta-analyses increased five-fold from 1999 to 2008, but the mean quality score did not change
significantly over time (p = 0.067). Up to 30% of meta-analyses had extensive methodological flaws.
[Dijkman BG 2010] Ifwe narrow the focus further, a recent renew of the quality of the RCTs of the
arthroplasty (81 hip, 80 knee and 19 combined hip/knee) literature reveals a worrying trend. This
study found that the mean overall quality scores (SEM) of arthroplasty trials was low: Jadad score
2.36 (1.4), Delphi list 5.33 (1.6) and NRS score 4.30 (2.6). Multivariable analyses revealed that non-
pharmacological intervention RCTs had lower odds (OR 0.28-0.39; p = 0.008-0.033) and those with
no funding had lower odds (OR 0.28-0.50; p = 0.014-0.119) of being in the highest quartiles of the
three overall quality scores. In contrast, multicentre RCTs had 1.8—4.7 times higher odds of being in
highest tertiles of quality scores (p = 0.017-0.185). [Singh JA 2009]
This leads us to an issue of great importance, but one that is neglected due to its infrequent
occurrence. Bone cement implantation syndrome is associated with substantial mortality and
morbidity. The syndrome is characterised by hypoxia, hypotension and unexpected loss of
consciousness; it can occur at any time from the time of cementation to the final deflation of the
tourniquet in patients having cemented bone surgery. [Donaldson AJ 2009] Two main mechanisms
have been suggested for its aetiopathogenesis. The more robust theory is that of emboli being
dislodged into the pulmonary vasculature because of high intrameduallary pressures and raised
temperatures developing during prosthesis insertion and cementation. [Orsini EC 1987] A less
favoured but nonetheless interesting theory is that of cement monomers being formed during
cementation, which in turn induce a widespread inflammatory response.
There is a paucity of evidence and hence rather predictable controversy and divergence of opinion
and practice about the use of cementation. Data from national joint registries indicate that surgeons
in Sweden, Denmark, the UK and Norway tend to favour cemented total hip replacements, whereas
Australian and Canadian surgeons tend to favour the use of uncemented total hip replacements. For
hemiarthroplasties, Swedish and Australian surgeons favour the use of cemented implants. [Panesar
SS 2009b]
National patient safety incident databases have been alerted to intraoperative deaths following the
use of bone cement in hip arthroplasty. My novel method in Study 1 (section 3.1), showed that
treatment or procedure errors warranted priority as several cases of death likely to be contributed to
the use of hip cement were noted. Careful trawling through the incidents found five cases of severe
harm, which were thought to be directly attributable to the use of bone cement. Further analysis of
the NRLS revealed that 96% (24/25) of the reported deaths related to a hip procedure (total hip
replacement or arthroplasty) were in patients having cemented procedures, while only 4% (1/25) of
deaths occurred in those receiving an uncemented prosthesis. An example of the reports is:
"Patient having cemented hip prosthesis inserted forfractured neck offemur. Cement inserted andprosthesis being
hammered into place when patient became bradycardias: 40 / min. Unresponsive to atropine. Loss ofpalpablepulse with
pulseless electrical activity, cardiac arrest. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation commenced and continuedfor 20 minutes and no
response to treatment. Patient died"; 'Pduringprocedure when introduction ofcement the patients condition deteriorated.
Patient died at 21:10"; and 'Patient was having an operationfor a right cemented [name ofprosthesis]. Patient went into
asystole when cementput into hipjoint".
Caution is urged when interpreting these results due to the frequent under-reporting of events,
possible selection biases, and the inability to adjust for potential confounding factors, such as
fracture severity and comorbidities. [Panesar SS 2009b]
A review of the literature in orthopaedics creates a picture of confusion. The overall death rate
within 30—90 days after total hip replacement is reported to range between 0.23 and 0.45%. [Sierra
RJ 2008, Sharrock NE 1995, Dearborn JT 1998, Parvizi J 2004] There has been a significant decline
in this rate over the last 15 years and, in a total cohort of 30,715 patients, the death rate was 0.15%
for cases having surgery in the 1990s compared with earlier decades (p<0.0002). [Barrett | 2005] A
single surgeon series of 2,736 hips reported a death rate of 0.18% if patients with severe pre-existing
disease were excluded. [Dearborn JT 1998] Sharrock studied the effect of changes in anaesthetic
technique on the death rate and the in-hospital rate was reduced to 0.18% with improved
techniques. [Sharrock NE 1995] The rates reported are lower than the number of expected deaths in
the normal population. Another study from the US has confirmed that total hip replacement
recipients survive longer than matched control in the Medicare population. [Barrett J 2005]
The latest National joint Registry report indicates a significantly reduced mortality rate (less than
half) at one year following primary total hip replacement (1.9%; 95% CI 1.8 to 2.0) than that of the
general population of England and Wales, using age- and gender-adjusted standardised mortality
ratios (SMR). [National joint Registry 2007] Indeed, this SMR is less for cemented hips (0.46; 95%
CI 0.42 to 0.50) than for cement-less (0.49; 95% CI 0.42 to 0.57) hips. Further, the use of cement
did not significantly influence the model when analysed using multivariate analysis, and hazard ratios
were similar (0.9; 95% CI 0.8 to 1.1) when cement was not used.
The 30-day mortality in a cohort of 7,774 arthroplasties was 2.4% (i.e. a 10-fold higher rate) when
compared with total hip replacements. [Parvizi j 2004] The in-hospital mortality rates of 200,000
total hip replacements, 100,000 partial hip replacements and 36,000 revision hip replacements
performed in the US in 2003 have been compared. [Zhan C 2007] The death rates associated with
these three procedures were 0.33%, 3.04% and 0.84%, respectively. The Swedish hemi-arthroplasty
register reporting approximately 12,000 joints corroborates this finding of significantly increased risk
in fracture patients: the 90-day mortality following hemi-arthroplasty was over 10-fold greater (12%)
compared with total arthroplasty. The authors point out that the two patient groups are entirely
different. Hemi-prosthesis patients are older, generally more ill and are in need of an emergency
operation with little time to stabilise their health state prior to surgery. The mortality rate was
significantly higher if surgery was delayed more than 48 hours. [Department of Orthopedics 2008]
There have been many studies that have been unable to identify an increased risk ofmortality with
the use of cement [Parker MJ 2006, Weinrauch PC 2006, Emery RJ 1991, Khan R] 2002a, Khan R]
2002b, Lo WH 1994] and another has in fact shown a decrease in 30-day mortality when cement is
used. [Foster AP 2005] Of note, a meta-analysis of 2,613 hemiarthroplasties found no statistical
difference in the outcome ofmortality experienced by the elderly hip fracture population undergoing
either a cemented or uncemented procedure. [Ahn ] 2008]
In a study of 25,000 hemiarthroplasty cases from the Australian Orthopaedic Association National
Joint Replacement Registry, an increased mortality rate was found day one post-operatively with
cement (p = 0.05). [Costain AD 2008] By one week, this trend reversed (p = 0.02). This trend
reversal persisted at one month (p = 0.03) and one year (p < 0.0001) post-operatively. Cemented
hips were the safer option for treatment at all time points after the day of surgery.
Conversely, one study found 23 intraoperative deaths, all in those having cemented procedures,
while no intraoperative deaths occurred in more than 12,500 patients who had a non-cemented
procedure. [Parvizi} 1999] Furthermore, an audit of 9,082 total hip arthroplasties using cement
identified only one intraoperative death secondary to a fat embolism. [Sierra R| 2008] Additionally, a
Cochrane review concluded that in view of the limited amount of high-quality evidence available, it
was not possible to definitively determine if any possible adverse effects of cement would offset any
advantages from the main potential benefit of reduced revision rates. [Corkill ] 1976] Interestingly,
in this respect, the revision rate has been reported as being higher in the uncemented group.
[National [oint Registry 2007]
Despite this uncertainty, NICE in the UK continues to recommend that cemented prosthesis should
be used for total hip replacements, citing long-term viability, relative cost-benefit (cemented
prostheses are cheaper), and a lack of evidence to support the idea that ease of revision in those who
have had uncemented prostheses would outweigh any poorer revision rate. [NICE 2009]
The NPSA sought to offer solutions to mitigate against the harm caused by the insertion of cement.
[NPSA 2009c] These solutions are in the form an RRR, which is shown in Appendix 5. This
advocates adequate patient assessment, good anaesthetic technique and good surgical technique. All
the recommendations are based on solid evidence-based guidelines. The risk factors associated with
increased peri-operative mortality are well recognised. These include increasing age [Parvizi J 2004,
Zhan C 2007]: the peri-operative mortality rate of 0.34% in 66—69 year olds increased to 3.75% if
the patient was over 85 years old. [Whittle ] 1993] The presence of co-morbidities including
cardiovascular disease and pre-existing respirator)- disease are well-documented. [Dearborn ]T 1998,
Parvizi ] 2004, Zhan C 2007, Parvizi ] 1999] Every attempt should be made to optimise the medical
condition of the patients before they undergo surgery. A study has shown that hospitals with higher
volumes of surgery have superior inpatient mortality rates and a reduced length of hospital stay.
[Doro C 2006]
Teams should ensure that anaesthetic and surgical techniques to reduce risk in fracture patients are
implemented. Sharrock studied the effect of changes in anaesthetic care and with modified
techniques reduced the risk of death from 0.36% to 0.1% after total hip replacement. [Sharrock NE
1995] Patients most at risk are those with limited cardiac reserve or with hypovolemia as they are
less able to compensate by vasoconstriction for any drop in blood pressure caused by reaming of the
canal or by cement. There should be vigilant intra-operative management of the patient by the
anaesthetist.
In summary, reduction of risk relies on:
1. recognition of the at-risk patient and constant monitoring of the patient throughout the
operation
2. assessment of cardiac filling — there must be adequate fluid loading to increase the response
to low cardiac output
3. use of vasoconstrictors/inotropes if hypotension does occur. [Dow A 2005]
Intra-operatively, every effort should be made to reduce the possibility of embolisation of fat and
marrow contents whether the hip is to be cemented or inserted without cement. [Doro C 2006,
Dow A 2005, Pitto RP 1998]
Thorough lavage of the medullary cavity7 with a pressurised system is mandatory to reduce the
embolic load [Christie J 1995, Breusch S 2000] and has also been shown to improve fixation of the
femoral component. [Malchau H 2000] Lavage should be carried out before any instrumentation of
the medullary cavity. [Clarius M 2005] The safest way to introduce cement is in retrograde fashion
from a gun. A suction catheter placed distally above the plug must be used to reduce pressure at the
cement/marrow vessel interface during cement insertion. A reduction in intramedullary pressure has
been reported to lead to a three-fold reduction in the intra-operative mortality rate. [Parvizi J 1999]
If the canal is adequately cleaned, and if the patient is adequately prepared and monitored during the
procedure, then cement pressurisation appears to confer no disadvantage with regards to risk and
improves fixation of the femoral component. [Sierra R] 2008, National ]oint Registry 2007,
Department of Orthopaedics 2008]
The UK's Chief Medical Officer's Annual Report for 2007 stressed the need to find ways of
reducing bone cement implantation syndrome. [Donaldson L 2008] One way of facilitating greater
clarity about safety considerations would be for orthopaedic surgeons and anaesthetists to continue
reporting possible safety incidents related to bone cement to the NRLS in as much detail as possible
to allow meaningful interrogation of these data. In parallel, we also need greater clarity on the
effectiveness of cementing compared with uncemented procedures. The logical way forward in this
respect is to investigate this question in head-to-head randomised trials. Such trials, while
individually almost certainly underpowered to study safety, could, if planned in a co-ordinated way,
provide valuable insights into safety by facilitating meta-analysis of adverse outcomes data. In view
of the frequency of the procedure and the considerable potential safety risks at stake, it is important
that both clinicians and academics join forces to promote development of a robust evidence base in
this neglected area.
3.3.5.1. Effectiveness of the alert
The alert [NPSA 2009c] was released on 11 March 2009 and NHS trusts had until 14 September
2009 to implement the recommendations. To date, 177/392 (45%) of trusts have indicated
compliance; 212/392 (54%) felt they did not need to comply; and 3/392 (0.8%) were still
implementing the alert. Until July 2012, no cases of severe harm/death owing to the use of hip
cement have been reported.
3.3.6. Example 4: Inpatient falls and fractures
NRLS data from across England and Wales indicate that approximately 208,000 falls are reported in
acute hospitals every year, with over 36,000 reported from mental health units and 38,000 from
community hospitals. A significant number of these falls result in death, or severe or moderate
injury, including around 840 fractured hips, 550 other types of fracture and 30 intracranial injuries.
[NPSA 2010b] Even for the less serious falls, the human cost of falling includes distress, pain, injury,
loss of confidence and loss of independence, as well as the anxiety caused to patients, relatives,
carers and hospital staff.
The causes of falls are complex. Hospital patients are particularly likely to be vulnerable to falling
through medical conditions including delirium, cardiac, neurological or musculoskeletal conditions,
side-effects from their medication, or problems with their balance, strength or mobility. Problems
such as poor eyesight or poor memory can create a greater risk of falls when someone is out of their
normal environment on a hospital ward, as they are less able to spot and avoid any hazards.
Continence problems can mean patients are vulnerable to falling while making urgent journeys to
the toilet. In hospital settings, falls are also often an ominous 'red flag' symptom, indicating the
patient's underlying medical condition may have deteriorated, and may merit urgent medical review,
regardless of injury. [IOM 2001]
Prevention of falls is understandably an important patient safety challenge for most healthcare
settings and a range of resources exist to help healthcare staff with this. [Patient Safety First
Campaign 2009] But what happens after a fall is equally important, as detecting and treating injury
from the fall as efficiently as possible will reduce the degree of harm caused to the patient. This is
particularly critical for injuries such as subdural haematoma that may progress to irreversible brain
damage if not detected early [NICE 2007] and fractured hip, where minimising the time elapsed
between fracture and surgery is vital to reducing mortality and disability. [BOA 2007] However, the
relative rarity of inpatient falls that result in serious injury - less than 1% of reported falls - can
make it challenging for staff to maintain their vigilance. [NPSA 2010b]
General issues of failures in aftercare had been previously identified from NRLS data and a
recommendation for NHS organisations to develop post-fall protocols was made by the NPSA in
2007 in Slips trips andfalls in hospital. [NPSA 2007]
Very few of the incidents were related to difficult to detect injury or difficult to interpret x-rays. The
majority of the delays appeared to be in basic assessment and observation, with patients either not
examined by medical staff or superficially examined. Although many of the patients were confused
and unlikely to have given a coherent account of their fall or their symptoms, the reports indicate
they were usually expressing pain or distress. In other examples there were obvious external
indications of injury found by later observers (although this may relate to bruising becoming more
visible with time, or undisplaced fracture displacing later, for example). Delays in fracture detection
ranged from a few hours to several days. In several cases, transfer between wards, or discharge
home, was when the fracture was detected. Other issues included:
• difficulty in accessing orthopaedic advice or orthopaedic beds (delaying diagnosis or surgery)
• unsafe retrieval (for example, use of sling hoists despite suspected spinal injury or obvious
fracture)
• failure to consider the greater vulnerability of anhcoagulated/coagulopathic patients;
• neurological observations taken only once immediately after the fall
• patients with repeated falls where date of fracture could not be established.
While the search strategy and criteria for inclusion above were not designed to find incidents where
a new illness/collapse caused the fall (for example cardiac problems or spontaneous intracranial
bleed), examples of equivalent lapses in observation or medical review have also been reported to
the NRLS.
It is not easy to separate the morbidity and mortality resulting from the fall injury, from that
resulting from the delay in treating the injury. Some intracranial injury is likely to have been
untreatable, even if detected in a more timely way, and some patients already had a terminal illness
when they fell.
Based on work undertaken by my novel method in Study 1 (section 3.1), one type of incident that
warranted prioritisation was 'patient accident'. Seventy-five incidents were reported that described
apparent failures in retrieval, or detection and treatment of injury, after inpatient falls resulting in
fracture or brain injury. The injuries that went undetected or where treatment was delayed were in
some cases multiple, but counting the most serious injury in each case, injury types were: 11
intracranial/subdural bleeds attributed to the trauma of the fall; 45 fractured hips; two spinal
fractures and 17 other fractures.
Delays in operating on a fractured hip are known to have significant impact on both mortality levels
and the likelihood of the patient regaining their former level of independence. [BOA 2007]
Inappropriate handling (for example, sling hoist or wheelchair use despite obvious deformity from
hip fracture) can cause intense pain and may reduce the likelihood of successful surgery.
For the more 'minor' fractures (including fractures of the humerus, pubic rami or lower limbs),
serious consequences of the delay in diagnosis were noted in a minority of cases in terms of loss of
function or mobility. Unnecessary pain resulted in many of these cases, either through inappropriate
retrieval and efforts to get the patient mobile again, or through prescribing painkillers appropriate
for bruises, not fractures. Some examples of the patient safety incidents related to inpatient falls is
shown in the box on the following page.
Community hospitals and mental health units can access the relevant expertise via their local
emergency services. Acute hospitals can use the expertise of their emergency department and
orthopaedic staff to develop post-fall protocols that conform to national guidance. Key reference
documents for standards of aftercare following a fall include those produced by the British
Orthopaedic Association, British Geriatrics Society and NICE. [BOA/British Geriatric Society
2007, NICE 2007]
The NICE guidance contains the following advice on frequency of neurological observations:
"1.7.2.1 Forpatients admittedfor head injury observation the minimum acceptable documented neurological observations
are: GCS [Glasgow Coma Scale],'1pupil si%e and reactivity; limb movements; respiratory rate; heart rate; bloodpressure;
temperature; blood oxygen saturation"
"1.7.3.1 Observations should be performed and recorded on a half-hourly basis until GCS equal to 15 has been achieved.
The minimumfrequency of observations forpatients with GCS equal to 15 should be asfollows, starting after the initial
assessment in the emergency department: half-hourlyfor 2 hours; then 1 -hourly for 4 hours then 2-hourly thereafter."
"1.7.3.2 Should apatient with GCS equal to 15 deteriorate at any time after the initial 2-hourperiod, observations
should revert to half-hourly andfollow the original frequency schedule. "
Examples of incidents related to inpatient falls reported to the NRLS
Neurological observations not taken or taken only once
"Patientfell in the corridor walking to the toilet Neuro obs were recorded and GCS 14 extensive swelling noted to
cut on left eyebrow and steristrips were applied. Also hadpainful arm and required analgesia. Patient was reviewed by the
doctor— x-ray requested due to queryfractured shoulder. Patient was responsive at 08:00. She was referred to
Orthopaedics re dislocated shoulder and kept nil by mouth pending theatre. At 10:30ampatient became unresponsive
and was reviewed by the doctor. Attendedfor urgent CT which radiology informed staff that result showed a large left
sided subdural haematoma. Reviewed by Neurosurgeon who stated thatpatient would not survive surgery... "
'Patient suffered head injury on wardprevious day. Pound 11.30 unconscious (GCS 3/15) bleedingfrom nose and
aspirating blood. Fixed and dilatedpupils. Significantly abnormal cardiovascular and respiratory observations.
Coagulopathy on background ofalcoholic liver disease. ISSUES No neuro obs being carried out after injury."
Delay in diagnosis of fracture or dislocation
"Staffheard a bang andfoundpt sitting on thefloor by her bed, she said she rolled out of bed. Patientgot up with
minimal assistance, no visible injury, complaining ofpain to right ribs. Reassurancegiven, BP 146/70, P 74, T 36.2,
refusedpain reliefmedication. Dr bleeped, reviewed by Psych SHO. Sent to [acute hospital] [eight dayspostfall]
admitted # right neck offemur and 7&8 right ribs, died [15 dayspostfall]."
'Patient admitted to [ward a]from [ward b] - on transfer to wardpatient hadpain in R hip and nursing assistant
noticed R leg was shorter and rotated— staffnurse informed, on call doctor informed x-ray requested and shows that hip
is dislocated, notes statepatientfell [three days earlier]. Manipulation on ward unsuccesful sopatient is now for high risk
surgery."
"Standingfrom toilet became dicpy stated that shefell to thefloor unwitnessed by staff. Sitting onfloor on arrival
complaining ofpain in right side, rib/back pain. Observations recorded and monitor. SAO informed to review.
Codeine/paracetamolprescribed. Informfamily. Chest x-ray [two days later] probable rib # plural collection. Patient not
to be left alone in patient toiletfacilities. 2 # ribs haemothorax chest drain five days later] transferred to ITU... "
No examination
"[Evening] Patientfound sitting on thefloor opposite to toilet in the bay. Staffnurse on night duty, initially had no
cause to think thisgentleman had injured himself, there was no complaint ofpain and they assisted him back to bed.
When they later went to him he was in more discomfort and one leg appeared shorter than the other. The staff informed
the next ofkin who later visited the ward. The ward team and consultant were made awarefirst thing in the morning.
They reviewedpatient and requested an x-ray. On x-ray he hasfractured his hip. "
Based on a random sample policy survey undertaken as evaluation of Slips trips andfalls in hospital., the
number of inpatient falls prevention policies that include advice on clinical checks after a fall has
risen from 19% in 2006 to 51% in 2009. However, very few of these post-fall protocols can be
considered 'gold standard'. [NPSA 2010b] Many policies appear to have drawn post-fall instructions
from a health and safety context, and omit clinical considerations (for example 'make the area safe
and report the incident'). There are few protocols that also cover the common scenario of a patient
falling because of new acute illness (for example heart block or stroke). Based on this survey,
important clinical components of a post-fall protocol include:
• ABC (airway/breathing/circulation)
• initial checks before attempting to move the patient for signs of serious injury (for example,
pain, limb deformity, loss of sensation)
• safe retrieval, including how to access equipment and expertise for patients who need
immobilisation or flat-lifting, and pain relief before moving the patient if appropriate
• observations to detect any potential new acute illness that caused the fall and to detect any
harm from the fall (for example, temperature, pulse, respiratory rate, blood pressure, oxygen
saturations, blood glucose)
• frequency and duration of neurological observations not only for patients with visible or
reported head injury, but also for patients where head injury cannot be excluded (for
example an unwitnessed fall) — this may include a more intensive and prolonged schedule of
observation for patients who are on anticoagulants or who are coagulopathic
• criteria that indicate which patients and circumstances need immediate, urgent or routine
medical review, investigations or referral to specialist teams, including special consideration
of patients who are on anticoagulants or who are coagulopathic
• providing appropriate supportive care (for example pressure relief, pain relief, fluid balance)
for patients with significant injury
• explaining to the patient what is being done and why while working through the steps above
• actions to reduce the risk of further falls and fragility fractures, including identifying and
acting on underlying risk factors, identifying and treating osteoporosis, and considering the
need for falls prevention equipment or special observation
• non-clinical aspects of falls prevention, including making safe any environmental hazard,
reporting and investigation processes, and informing relatives/keyworker. [NPSA 2011b]
In revising local post-fall protocols, organisations should take advice from their local emergency
department. This is so that observations and investigations for inpatients after a fall (for example,
frequency of neurological observations and thresholds for x-ray or CT scanning) reflect those which
would be undertaken for patients presenting to emergency departments and conform with NICE
Clinical Guideline 56. [NICE 2007] Local emergency departments will also be well placed to advise
on avoiding unnecessary application of immobilisation and ensuring any period of immobilisation
and subsequent management is appropriate and as short (but effective,) as possible. Such advice may
be based, for example, on Advanced Trauma Life Support guidelines [American College of
Surgeons], National X-Radiography Utilization Study Group [Hoffman ]R 1992] or Canadian
cervical spine imaging rules. [Stiell IG 2001]
Concerns have previously been raised that hospitals continue to use an out-dated 14-point form of
the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), and even hospitals using the correct 15-point scale may be reliant
on local photocopying that over time creates blurred and poor quality formats. As part of revising
their post-fall protocol, organisations should ensure all wards and inpatient units have access to clear
versions* and that old formats are destroyed. Where possible, formats for recording neurological
observations should also contain clear guidance on how to correcdy take and record the GCS (for
example, advice on how to determine best motor response on the rear of the chart) * Locally-used
formats should emphasise the need to seek urgent medical review if the GCS drops. [Weise MF
2003]
Examples can be found at hrtp://www.nice.org.uk/CG056
Examples can be found in the falls prevention resources area ofwww.patientsnfctvtirst.nhs.uk
Further detailed advice on hospital falls prevention, including secondary prevention following an
inpatient fall, is provided in Slips trips andfalls and the 'How to' guide to reducing harm from falls.
[NPSA 2010b]
The NPSA suggested actions for the RRR on preventing falls are:
NHS organisations with inpatient beds should ensure that:
1. They have a post-fall protocol that includes:
a) checks by nursing staff for signs or symptoms of fracture or potential for spinal injury
before the patient is moved
b) safe manual handling methods for patients with signs or symptoms of fracture or
potential for spinal injury
c) frequency and duration of neurological observations for all patients where head injury
has occurred or cannot be excluded (e.g. unwitnessed falls) based on NICE Clinical
Guideline 56: Head injury
d) timescales for medical examination following a fall (including fast track assessment for
patients with signs of serious injury, or high vulnerability to injury, or who have been
immobilised).
2. Their post-fall protocol is easily accessible (e.g. laminated versions at nursing stations).
3. Their staff have access to clear guidance and formats for recording neurological
observations using a 15-point version of the GCS and that changes in the GCS that should
trigger urgent medical review are highlighted.
4. Their staff have access at all times to special equipment (e.g. hard collars, flat-lifting
equipment, scoops) and colleagues with the expertise to use it, for patients with suspected
fracture or potential for spinal injury.
5. Systems are in place allowing inpatients injured in a fall access to investigation and
specialist treatment that is equal in speed and quality to that provided in emergency
departments and conforms to NICE Clinical Guideline 56: Head Injury. [NPSA 2010b;
Healey F 2011]
3.4. Study 4: A novel use of patient safety reporting systems: developing an
Orthopaedic Error Index
The Orthopaedic Error Index (OEI) for hospitals aims to provide the first national assessment of
the relative safety of provision of orthopaedic surgery. The NRLS is the largest national repository
of patient safety incidents in the world. It offers a unique opportunity to develop novel approaches
to enhancing patient safety, including investigating the relative safety of different healthcare
providers and specialties. I extracted all orthopaedic reports from the system over one year (2009—
2010). The OEI was calculated as a sum of the error propensity and severity. All relevant hospitals
offering orthopaedic surgery in England were then ranked by this metric to identify possible outliers
that warrant further attention. There were 155 hospitals that reported 48,971 orthopaedic-related
patient safety incidents. The mean OEI was 7.09/year (SD 2.72); five hospitals were identified as
outliers. Three of these units were specialist tertiary hospitals carrying out complex surgery; the
remaining two outlier hospitals had unusually high OEIs: meanl4.46 (SD 0.29) and 15.29 (SD 0.51),
respectively. The OEI has enabled identification of hospitals that may be putting patients at
disproportionate risk of orthopaedic-related iatrogenic harm and which therefore warrant further
investigation. It provides the prototype of a summary index of harm to enable surveillance of unsafe
care over time across institutions. This novel approach has the potential to be extended to other
hospital specialties in the UK and also internationally to other health systems that have comparable
national databases of patient safety incidents.
3.4.1. Introduction
Over a decade ago, the IOM published the seminal report, To Err is Human, [Kohn LT 1999] which
revealed the previously under-recognised high burden of morbidity and mortality associated with
iatrogenic harm. This was then followed by the equally influential Crossing the Quality Chasm, which
highlighted the need to develop and make greater use of error reporting systems to enable learning
from patient safety incidents and create opportunities for system-level interventions to reduce future
risks of harm. [IOM 2001] The challenge for healthcare systems globally remains the consistent
delivery of safer care and the associated surveillance of safety within an organisation.
Modern day healthcare involves an array of complicated diagnostic and therapeutic decisions
affected by the system within which these occur. Poorly functioning systems and teams have the
potential to impact on patient safety. Inevitably, there will be unexpected variation in access,
outcomes and quality of care. Whereas some variation is legitimate and indeed desirable (for
example, slower surgeons should not be asked to work faster), it is the unwarranted variation that is
a major cause of concern to policy-makers and regulators. [NHS Confederation] A much-favoured
approach for describing this variability is the use of hospital-wide mortality rates. Proponents have
argued that these tools provide useful metrics about problems with the quality of inpatient care,
uncover system-wide failures, and can help patients to choose the safest hospital. [Bottle A 2010]
PSRSs are unused sources of data for the surveillance of harm which enable learning from errors, so
that the insights create opportunities for system-level interventions to reduce future risks of harm.
Some successes have been reported, for example in identifying previously undetected risks of new
chugs or procedures, but there remain doubts about the wider value of investment in developing and
maintaining large-scale incident reporting systems. [Leape LL 2002]
Databases of error reports now exist in many parts of the world, including the UK and the US.
[Sheikh A 1999, Panesar SS 2009a, Hickner | 2010] The UK's NRLS was launched in 2003 and has
since accrued over seven million records, making it the most substantial repository of patient safety
incidents in the world. Analyses of this database have revealed risks in a range of clinical areas,
[Panesar SS 2009a, Cresswell KM 2008] but what has been lacking are high-level, valid summary
metrics to allow surveillance of harm across a whole healthcare system in a way that allows, for
example: comparison between hospitals; monitoring of time trends; and a baseline for assessing and
evaluating interventions. This is necessary because of the large volume of incident reports.
Here, I report on the development of one such summary statistic, which aims to (unlike the
currently used proxy measures of harm such as hospital standardised mortality ratios [HSMRs])
provide a more direct measure of safety. [Lilford R 2010] I developed and tested this measure in the
field of orthopaedic surgery. This specialty was chosen because it is associated with a relatively high
level of harm. [Panesar SS 2012] For example, from 2000 to 2006, an equivalent of US$321 million
was paid in adult orthopaedic surgery-related negligence settlements in the UK. [Atrey A 2010]
Similar figures were reported the Physician Insurers Association of America (PIAA). [Parikh PD]
3.4.2. Methods
3.4.2. J. Developing a modelfor an error index
Errors will occur in complex systems such as healthcare, and their frequency will relate to the
number of procedures undertaken. Such assumptions are made in other fields of risk — in road
traffic accidents, for example, predicted crash frequency is a linear function of average daily traffic.
[American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials 2010]
A simple measure of error is the frequency of errors occurring in any hospital. Flowever, since
frequency is a function of the number of procedures that have been carried out, I deemed the
frequency of errors per unit of procedure as a more appropriate measure after discussion with the
statistician, Professor Gopalakrishnan Netuveli. This is called the errorpropensity. In order to calculate
this, I extracted data on all orthopaedic reports made by all English hospitals reporting to the NRLS
over a 12-month period, i.e. from 1 April, 2009 to 31 March, 2010. In parallel, I approximated the
total number of orthopaedic procedures carried out in each hospital using data from the national
Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) (2009—2010) database, [Hospital Episode Statistics] which is a
mandatory national database of all patient visits to NHS hospitals in England, in order to estimate
the error propensity.
A second component of the OEI reflects the impact the error has on the patients, i.e. how much
harm it resulted in. This I termed the error severity, which is based on categories of harm. Harm was
defined by user self-reports; the degree of harm was classified as either: no harm, low harm (minimal
harm — patient(s) required extra observation or minor treatment), moderate harm (short-term harm
— patient(s) required further treatment, or procedure), severe harm (permanent or long-term harm),
or death (please see Panel 1 in Chapter 3). Further details about the structure of the NRLS are
provided in Sections 1.3 and 1.4. I created my summary statistic, the OEI, using principles laid out
in the Standards for Statistical Models used for Public Reporting of Health Outcomes. [Krumholz
HM 2006]
The OEI is the sum of the number of errors (propensity, P) and the degree of harm (severity, S).
The assumption is that this should enable identification of hospitals with large numbers of errors
and similarly those units with the greatest degree of harm. It is reasonable to assume that as more
procedures are carried out, a larger number of errors will be reported, although I am also cognizant
that there is potentially a high risk of errors in units undertaking relatively few procedures.
[Birkmeyer |D 2002]
3.4.2.2. Calculating the errorpropensity and severity
For each hospital, P was calculated as:
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where n was the number of procedures where any error had occurred and N was the total number of
procedures; P had a range of 100, with 0 representing the lowest error propensity and 100
representing the largest error propensity.
The standard error of P (PSE) was calculated as:
Ipnoo-P)
It is also important to capture the severity of the error. Each error report in the database contains an
NPSA code for severity which is ordinal in character. I developed a severity index based on
proportion of each harm category weighed for its severity.
For each hospital, the Severity (J) was calculated as a weighted sum: S =^ wlni / n , where wt is the
weight for the ith error severity category; #; is the number of procedures where ith error severity
category occurred; and n is the number of procedures where any error occurred.
3.4.2.3. Method ofdetermining weights
The relative frequency of each harm category was calculated using the IPW (IPW = 1 / relative
frequency) and IPW relative to the no harm category.
I therefore chose a weighting system computed as 2' where i was the ordinal number of error
severity category, from 0 for no harm to 4 for death. '2' was selected as it was the smallest possible
integer that can be used to show a weighting effect and should therefore produce the most
conservative estimate. The error severity was also rescaled to a range of 0 to 100 as done with S.
For this purpose, the harm categories were assigned numerical values from 0 to 4 (no harm = 0, low
harm = 1, moderate harm = 2, high harm = 3, and death = 4) to reflect their natural order of
severity. The weight assigned to the th harm category was 2'.
where, «,is number of procedures where th harm category occurred and n is the number of
procedures where any error occurred. The constant term 100/16, 16 or 24, being the maximum value
possible (when all reported errors were deaths) for the variable part of the formula, was used to
adjust the scale of the index so that 100 was the maximum value, representing a situation where all
errors reported resulted in deaths. The minimum value would be 6.67, representing the case where
all reported errors produced no harm. I intentionally avoided rescaling S, 0 to 100, to differentiate
between the situation where no errors were reported and some errors were reported but they were
all in the no harm category.
The standard error of S was computed as:
An exponential approach was used as the severity of incidents in most hospitals tends to increase in
such a manner; there are several-fold more 'no harm' (also sometimes known as near misses)
incidents than 'low harm' incidents; furthermore, the gradation from 'death' to 'no harm' incidents
in any one year, follows an inverted pyramid, similar to Fleinrich's ratio in which one can see that for
every one major incident, 29 minor injuries and 300 near-misses occurred previously. [Heinrich HW
1941]
3.4.2.4. Orthopaedic Error Index, OEI
I defined the OEI, E, as the weighted sum of error propensity and error severity:
E = 0.5P + 0.55
This index gives equal weights for propensity, which captures the overall number of errors and
severity of errors, because both aspects are considered important in dealing with errors. The weights
were chosen so that E has a range of 0 to 100. The standard error of E was computed as:
r _ \?se +
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To identify reporting bias, I used the relationship between number of procedures and OEI. For this
purpose I first meta-regressed the OEI on number of procedures and saved the predicted values of
OEI.
3.4.2.5. Analyses
I estimated P, S, and OEI and their standard errors for each hospital using STATA 11 (StataCorp.
2011. Stata Statistical Software: Release 12. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP). Since propensity,
severity and the OEI deviated from normality, they were first transformed: OEI using a logarithmic
transformation, and severity and propensity by taking their reciprocal values. I sought to identify
outliers by creating control lines at one, two and three standard deviations (SD). I plotted OEI (per
1,000 procedures) against number of procedures and superimposed lines representing the mean and
+ /- 2SD and 3SD of predicted OEI values. Funnel plots provided a visual representation of the
data and have been used widely in health services research to compare institutions. I defined outliers
as those with an OEI outside the range of p. ± 3a, where p is the mean and a is the SD for the
whole sample. These hospitals may require closer scrutiny. [Spiegelhalter DJ 2005]
3.4.3. Strengths and limitations
3.4.3.1. Strengths
Errors can be caused by active failures, for example, mistakes and latent conditions, such as failure
of system processes. [Reason | 2000] Usually primary7 data from small, in-depth, qualitative inquiries
are used to identify factors that contributed to the errors. The main strength of this approach is that
data are specific for patient safety, but a major limitation is the trade-off between the depth and
breadth of the analysis. I sought to investigate the use of routinely collected patient safety incident
reports to create a numerical index that could help to provide a complementary perspective by
supporting the monitoring of the overall system-wide safety of healthcare provision. Other key
strengths of this work included drawing on a large national dataset, comprising of over 48,000
orthopaedic reports, and utilising the full body of data reporting on patient safety incidents spanning
the full spectrum of severity from no harm to death. At present, the learning from national PSRSs is
limited; some of the information is lost in translation and it is unclear whether all patient-safety
incidents are indeed reported. [Lankshear A 2008] The sensitivity of the NRLS at picking up errors
has been questioned [Sari AB-A 2007]. Furthermore, all hospitals use the same mechanism of
reporting incidents, so the effects of bias and uncertainty are limited with the OEI. Nevertheless,
this should not deter exploratory work such as mine. I was also cognisant of the fact that there was
likely to be a variation in reporting according to the patient safety culture within hospitals; so a
hospital with a high OEI may be one that has an open culture and encourages staff to report patient
safety incidents. [NPSA 2004] Of equal importance was the fact that NRLS was a voluntary
reporting system until April 2010, when mandatory reporting was introduced for serious untoward
incidents. [NPSA 2010c] In Figure 3.5 I showed that large hospitals (number of orthopaedic
procedures) are associated with fewer errors. This must be interpreted with caution as I was not able
to adjust for patient or procedure case-mix due to the paucity and anonymity of the data. Based on
work elsewhere, it has been stipulated that specialised surgical services should be provided in tertiary
hospitals, although geographical or logistical impediments may occur. [Shervin N 2007] I cannot
make this claim based on my findings. Some local systems of risk management in hospitals opt for
root cause analyses to develop local solutions to mitigate harm to patients, but these are not shared
nationally, and limited information may be provided to national reporting systems. These systems
rely on patient safety experts methodically trawling through patient safety incidents by severity and
frequency, thereby leading to the production of quarterly reports, alerts and rapid response
solutions. [NPSA 2009d] Such analyses are time consuming and, as the number of reports rapidly
increases, may in the future be unsustainable. [Lamont T 2009; Catchpole K 2008b] There is also a
non-cohesive approach globally to identifying unsafe hospitals. The multitude of quality indicators
that are proxy measures of unsafe care is overwhelming. The OEI is a surveillance tool that can
enable direct evaluation of safer care in hospitals. It is, I believe, a novel benchmarking tool to assess
patient safety across hospitals using a large patient safety reporting system.
3.4.3.2. Limitations
There are several methodological limitations to the creation of the OEI. In creating the error
propensity and severity, I built on the idea that the consequences of a medical error can vary from
negligible to fatal. The error propensity index treats all reported errors equally. However, there is a
qualitative difference between hospitals which have the same Ep, but in one the proportion of death
harm is nearly double the other. Therefore, it was necessary to create a second variable, severity.
When calculating, the IPW in the manner I chose, two important drawbacks need to be considered:
first, high values were attributed to severe harm and death. Secondly, the generalisability or external
validity of these findings is unknown such that another dataset with a different distribution may have
yielded different weights.
My finding that greater harm categories occur less frequently than 'no harm' or 'low harm' incidents
was confirmation of the famous Heinrich ratio, although this was not formally assessed. [Heinrich
HW 1941] Referring to the ratio, an expert group on learning from adverse events in the NHS
argued for the importance of reporting near misses:
"Not all unsafe systemsproduce bad outcomes all the time. Thepotentialfor disasters may exist, butfor any
number of reasons those disasters might not occur at all, or occur very rarely — what has been termed 'a
dynamic non-event'. Ifthere are no bad outcomes to monitor, safety information systems need to collect,
analyse and disseminate information from incidents and near misses, as well asfrom regularproactive checks
on the system's 'vitalsigns'." [Department of Health 2000]
General limitations were those inherent to any secondary analysis of data, including the absence of
specific information needed and necessities of using proxies. Ideally, I would have preferred to fink
HES data to corresponding NRLS incidents. At present, this is not possible, as the latter does not
allow for patient identification via NHS identification numbers. HES data will also give an
approximation of orthopaedic and trauma procedures due to coding inaccuracies. However, these
are, I believe, largely mitigated in the present analysis by the fact that the data were collected to study
error and I refer to my analyses as secondary only because the analysis approach I employed was
unanticipated when the study was designed. However, the OEI has several potential limitations.
Reporting of patient safety incidents is a subjective exercise and variation in the dataset is bound to
exist. Biases also exist at several levels: reporting of harmful versus non-harmful events and correct
classification of categories of harm. [Heinrich HW 1941] Underlying factors for these biases, such as
the level of patient safety culture within institutions, were not assessed. [Department of Health 2000]
Further work on measuring the extent and likely impact of such biases is therefore now needed.
3.4.4. Results
3.4.4.1. OEIfor all hospitals in England
In England, 155 NHS hospitals reported 48,971 patient safety incidents with varying degrees of
harm: 34,530/48,971 (70.5%) no harm; 11,529/48,971 (23.5%) low harm; 2,632/48,971 (5.4%)
moderate harm; 217/48,971 (0.4%) severe harm; and 63/48,971 (0.1%) deaths in the specialty of
trauma and orthopaedic surgery during 2009—2010. The mean hospital OEI was 7.09 (SD 2.72).
There was a correlation between the number of procedures and error reports of 0.40; therefore an
increase of 1,000 orthopaedic procedures generated approximately 38 additional error reports
(Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4: Relationship between member oferror reports and volume ofprocedures
1400
Number of procedures
3.4.4.2. Identifying outlier hospitals
Among the 155 hospitals, five lay outside the pre-specified control limits (Figure 3.5). These were
hospitals which had relatively small numbers of procedures, but high OEI values. Table 3.10
identifies the key characteristics of these outliers.





























































1 Acute specialist hospital (including
acute specialist children)
1,093 120 9.89 0.72
2 Medium acute hospital 5,601 1,209 14.46 0.28
3 Small acute hospital 2,085 410 15.29 0.51
4 Acute specialist hospital (including
acute specialist children)
1,222 63 6.04 0.42
5 Acute specialist hospital (including
acute specialist children)
2,277 80 7.10 0.63
3.4.5. Discussion
The OEI is the first attempt to develop automated procedures to interrogate a national database of
patient safety incidents in order to identify hospitals at disproportionate risk of iatrogenic harm.
Applying this tool to all hospitals providing orthopaedic care identified five outlying hospitals: three
tertiary care providers and two secondary care providers. Whilst the higher rates may be expected
because of case-mix considerations in the tertiary care sites, such deviations are not to be expected
in the secondary care providers.
One of these two secondary care providers has subsequendy been highlighted nationally as
providing sub-standard care due to failures in administration, management and nursing. [Robert
Francis Inquiry Report 2012]
At present, the NFIS and other health systems internationally lack direct indicators of safety.
Mortality is a proxy measure and cannot be used in isolation to assess the safety of a hospital.
Opponents argue that the construction of FISMRs is flawed as the index is unable to discriminate
between inevitable and preventable deaths, and that the huge variability in care suggested by these
metrics cannot be accounted for by variable quality of care alone. [Lilford R 2010] Nevertheless, one
of the hospitals that I identified as an outlier, and that has been the subject of national inquiries, was
also noted to have a high FISMR; an excess of up to 1,200 deaths occurred here. [Dyer C 2011a] I
have thus shown that a PSRS, which until recently has been used as a repository collecting reports of
errors, can be used to identify institutions that may pose a disproportionate risk to patient safety.
I have created a novel metric, the OEI, which is a direct marker of patient safety in individual
hospitals. The thrust behind this idea has been the occurrence of several high-profile cases of
hospitals such as Alder Hey, Mid Staffordshire and Stockport NHS hospitals where a catalogue of
medical errors occurred that resulted in varying degrees of harm to the patient. [Delamothe T 2010]
Most people would agree that in an era of large datasets, regulators and advisory bodies should have
mechanisms to identify hospitals that are struggling to deliver high-quality care at an earlier stage so
that corrective responses can be initiated. Despite alarming cases of unsafe care, it appears the NHS
is still ill-equipped to identify high-risk hospitals through early warning systems. [Dyer C 2011b]
More recently, attempts have been made in the UK to identify failing hospitals by using nationwide
surveillance tools which collect data prospectively: the NHS Safety Thermometer that collects data
on four domains: venous thromboembolism, urinary tract infections, pressure ulcers and falls; [NHS
Safety Thermometer 2010] the National Surgical Quality Improvement Programme which collects
measures of outcomes to improve surgical care; [American College of Surgeons 2012] and the
Global Trigger Tool which measures adverse events. [IHI Global Tigger Tool] However, not all
hospitals use these tools. Mine is the first tool that uses data from an entire national healthcare
system.
3.4.5.1. Strengths and limitations
Errors can be caused by active failures, for example, mistakes and latent conditions, such as failure
of system processes. [Reason J 2000] Usually primary data from small, in-depth, qualitative inquiries
are used to identify factors that contributed to the errors. The main strength of this approach is that
data are specific for patient safety, but a major limitation is the trade-off between the depth and
breadth of the analysis. I sought to investigate the use of routinely collected patient safety incident
reports to create a numerical index that could help to provide a complementary perspective by
supporting the monitoring of the overall system-wide safety of healthcare provision. Other key
strengths of this work include drawing on a large national dataset, comprising of over 48 000
orthopaedic reports, and utilising the full body of data reporting on patient safety incidents spanning
the full spectrum of severity from no harm to death. At present, the learning from national PSRSs is
limited; some of the information is lost in translation and it is unclear whether all patient-safety
incidents are indeed reported. [Lankshear A 2008] The sensitivity of the NRLS at picking up errors
has been questioned in the past [Sari AB-A 2007] and the low power of the study limits
generalisability of results to the entire NRLS. Furthermore, all hospitals use the same mechanism of
reporting incidents, so the effects of bias and uncertainty are limited with the OEI. Nevertheless,
this should not deter exploratory work such as mine. I am also cognisant of the fact that there is
likely to be a variation in reporting according to the patient safety culture within hospitals; so a
hospital with a high OEI may be one that has an open culture and encourages staff to report patient
safety incidents. [NPSA 2004] Of equal importance is the fact that NRLS was a voluntary reporting
system until April 2010, when mandatory reporting was introduced for serious untoward incidents.
[NPSA 2010c] In Figure 3.5 I showed that large hospitals (number of orthopaedic procedures) are
associated with fewer errors. This must be interpreted with caution as I have not been able to adjust
for patient or procedure case-mix due to the paucity and anonymity of the data. Based on work
elsewhere, it has been stipulated that specialised surgical sendees should be provided in tertiary
hospitals, although geographical or logistical impediments may occur. [Shendn N 2007] I cannot
make this claim based on my findings. Some local systems of risk management in hospitals opt for
root cause analyses to develop local solutions to mitigate harm to patients, but these are not shared
nationally, and limited information may be provided to national reporting systems. These systems
rely on patient safety experts methodically trawling through patient safety incidents by severity and
frequency, thereby leading to the production of quarterly reports, alerts and rapid response
solutions. [NPSA 2009d] Such analyses are time consuming and, as the number of reports rapidly
increases, may in the future be unsustainable. [Lamont T 2009; Catchpole K 2008b] There is also a
non-cohesive approach globally to identifying unsafe hospitals. The multitude of quality indicators
that are proxy measures of unsafe care is overwhelming. The OEI is a surveillance tool that can
enable direct evaluation of safer care in hospitals. It is, I believe, a novel benchmarking tool to assess
patient safety across hospitals using a large patient safety reporting system.
The main limitations are those inherent to any secondary analysis of data, including the absence of
specific information needed and necessities of using proxies. Ideally, I would have preferred to link
HES data to corresponding NRLS incidents. At present, this is not possible, as the latter does not
allow for patient identification via NHS identification numbers. HES data will also give an
approximation of orthopaedic and trauma procedures due to coding inaccuracies. However, these
are, I believe, largely mitigated in the present analysis by the fact that the data were collected to study
error and I refer to my analyses as secondary only because the analysis approach I employed was
unanticipated when the study was designed. However, the OEI has several potential limitations.
Reporting of patient safety incidents is a subjective exercise and variation in the dataset is bound to
exist. Biases also exist at several levels: reporting of harmful versus non-harmful events and correct
classification of categories of harm. [Heinrich HW 1941] Underlying factors for these biases, such as
the level of patient safety culture within institutions, were not assessed. [Department of Health 2000]
Further work on measuring the extent and likely impact of such biases is therefore now needed.
3.4.5.2. Conclusions
With the proliferation of PSRSs around the world and an ever-increasing number of patient safety
incidents reported to them, sophisticated analytical techniques are required to identify hospitals that
need to strengthen their emphasis on patient safety. This is the first time, to my knowledge, that a
surveillance mechanism for safety has been proposed using a reporting system.
4. Limitations of the dataset
Whereas the NRLS has provided what, in some cases, are the first insights into key areas of unsafe
care in orthopaedic surgery and offered candidate solutions to prevent their recurrence, several
limitations of this database exist and these have been grouped as follows: comprehensiveness and
quality.
4.1. Comprehensiveness
The comprehensiveness of the data in the NRLS varies from organisation to organisation. The
NRLS comprised data collected by over 400 different NHS Trusts, each with varying systems that
collect and store data. Counts of incidents are simply incidents reported to the NPSA — they are
likely to represent only a small subset of the number of incidents that actually occurred. Incident
reports are often made soon after the incident occurs, but before the incident has been investigated
locally. Therefore, reports to the NRLS may not contain complete information about the incident,
especially findings of more detailed investigations such as root cause analysis. [Lamont T 2009; Wu
AW 2008]
Some incidents recorded in local risk management systems and subsequently forwarded to the
NRLS may not technically be patient safety incidents. For example, deaths from natural causes
which occurred in hospital, and also deaths where patients died unexpectedly without any associated
patient safety incident, are sometimes reported to local risk management systems, for local audit
purposes, and hence are reported to the NRLS. The data are likely to include incidents where the
impact on the patient is not clear, or where it is not clear if the incident could have been avoided.
For example, suicides are often reported to local risk management systems in cases where the event
could not have been prevented by health sendees. [Lamont T 2009]
It is also important to note that a higher number of reported incidents from a trust, specialty or
location does not necessarily mean that the trust, specialty or location has a higher number of
incidents; it may instead reflect greater levels of reporting. An increase in the number of incidents
reported should not be taken as an indication of a worsening of patient safety, but rather an
indication of increasing levels of awareness of safety issues amongst healthcare professionals.
[Robinson Wolf Z 2008, Stratton KM 2004, Mayo AM 2004] It might also indicate a worsening
safety profile. However, experience in other industries has shown that as an organisation's reporting
culture matures, staff become more likely to report incidents. However, even in high reporting
organisations, many incidents do not get reported. [Sari AB-A 2007]
Reporting levels and rates from trusts vary greatly. Some trusts report daily, others not at all. In
many cases, incidents are batched and sent in large loads. It should never be assumed that the total
number of patient safety incidents is representative of totals across the NHS. The reporting culture
varies between trust types. Reporting in secondary care is far greater than that in primary care.
Ambulance and mental health organisations have the most varied reporting patterns. Quarterly data
reports reveal the patient safety reporting tendency of trusts. [NPSA 201 la]
4.2. Quality
The reporting of degree of harm in the NRLS is intended to be the actual degree of harm suffered
by the patient. There can be confusion between the potential degree of harm of an incident with
actual degree of harm that occurred, for example coding near misses (where no harm resulted) as
severe harm or death. The NRLS requires the degree of harm to reflect the actual and not the
potential degree of harm caused by the patient safety incident. [NPSA 2004] The data in the NRLS
are not checked with the reporter as the data are confidential. So there is no way to verify or clarify
the contents of the incidents. Information on the identities of individual staff or patients is not held.
Within the NRLS, steps are taken to maximise the quality of the data held by checking for duplicate
reports and feeding back to individual trusts if there are problems with their reports.
When performing analysis on patient demographics, it is important to take into account missing
data. Gender is completed for approximately 70% of patients, age in 66% and ethnicity for only
20% of patients. [Personal communication with Information Analysis Team, NPSA] It should not
be assumed that the missing data are evenly distributed and levels of missing data should be stated in
any output. The lack of a denominator also limits epidemiological work. [Lamont T 2009]
4.3. Epidemiological trends
The NRLS was established in 2004 and all trusts were connected by 2005. The NPSA worked with
trusts to increase their reporting, and to promote a more open culture in healthcare sendees.
Experience in other industries has shown that as an organisation's reporting culture matures, staff
become more likely to report incidents. However, even in high reporting organisations, many
incidents do not get reported. [Sari AB-A 2007] Epidemiological work using the NRLS is in its
infancy, although the work in this thesis should provide the momentum for others to explore this
area further.
4.4. Reporting rates
Reporting levels and rates from trusts vary gready. Some trusts report daily, others not at all. In
many cases, incidents are batched and sent in large loads. It should never be assumed that the total
number of patient safety7 incidents is representative of totals across the NHS. The reporting culture
varies between trust types. Reporting in secondary care is far greater than that in primary care.
Ambulance and mental health organisations have the most varied reporting patterns. Quarterly data
reports reveal the patient safety reporting tendency of trusts. [NPSA 2011a]
5. Discussion
The challenges to improving patient safety in healthcare remain significant. This national database
represents an important step and resource in ensuring that information about adverse events is both
learned from and shared throughout the NHS. All clinicians, regardless of specialty, can contribute
to these efforts by reporting patient safety incidents to the NRLS. Whilst important challenges
remain in relation to encouraging fuller, franker and more comprehensive reporting, and then
meaningfully analysing these data, it is, I believe, fair to conclude that very substantial progress has
been made. As a clear leader in reporting systems, the successes and failures of the NRLS are likely
to have major implications on reporting systems in other parts of the UK and internationally, and so
it is that I suggest very much in the collective interests of patients nationally and internationally that
we, irrespective as a profession, engage with, report to and make use of this resource to the best of
our ability. In the next section, I will raise key questions on the NRLS; answers to these are
important if we are to engage orthopaedic surgeons, and indeed the wider healthcare community,
with better reporting and learning.
The aim of orthopaedic surgery is to ensure that the patient reaches the optimal condition in the
shortest possible amount of time by using the safest possible techniques. Indeed the specialty has
grown exponentially from rudimentary approaches of fracture reduction to sophisticated implants
for fixation. These advances have been made possible through better understanding of tribology,
[Walker PS 1971] which has resulted in one of the greatest contributions of orthopaedic surgery: hip
replacement surgery.
Vrimiwi non nocere or 'First do no harm' is a sacrosanct term that should underpin surgical practice.
Whereas this guiding principle is applied to the best of a surgeon's ability, medicine is no longer
'simple, ineffective and relatively safe' but rather 'complex, effective and potentially dangerous'.
[Chantler C 1999] There are 234 million operations carried out globally each year, with almost seven
million patients having major complications, and one million dying during or immediately following
surgery. [Weiser TG 2008] The expansion in surgery has been made possible through extraordinary
technological advances delivering considerable benefits for patients. Outcomes have improved
significantly and increasingly complex surgical procedures are accepted as commonplace. The
increasing complexity has made it much more difficult to deliver reliable care. The number of
patients that receive everything that is expected is surprisingly low, whilst the number of those that
experience some error, either of omission or commission, is surprisingly high. [Emerton M 2009]
Over a six-month period in one US surgical centre, a death rate due to error of one in 270 (0.4%)
was found, of which 65% (12.6% of all deaths) were deemed preventable. [Calland ]F, 2002] At
present, surgery has been categorised as a 'very unsafe' industry with a total rate of fatal adverse
events estimated at one per 10,000. In trauma surgery, the rate of serious complications is one in
100. When these statistics are contrasted to civil aviation, railway transport and nuclear power, where
the rate of death is less than one per million exposures, healthcare emerges as dangerous. [Amalberti
R 2005] In addition to the cost ofmorbidity and mortality, there is an added financial cost. Clinical
negligence claims cost £860 million in the financial year 2010/11. This is a staggering 9% increase
on the previous financial year. Undoubtedly the advent and commonplace nature of 'no win no fee'
legal firms has added to this encumbrance. According to the NHSLA, the highest number of clinical
negligence claims came from surgical specialties. Of these, orthopaedic surgery was the worst
offending specialty with 87/292 (29.8%) of all cases. [Robinson PM 2011]
This leads us to pose the question ofwhether the burden of errors in orthopaedic surgery is a result
of the ever-increasing complexity and volume of surgical procedures, failure to embrace a safer
culture, or a combination of both. Almost a decade ago, the landmark reportAn Organisation with a
Memory [Department of Health 2000] highlighted that serious failures in healthcare do occur; 10% of
all hospital patients experience a medical error and half of these are preventable. It also affirmed the
need to prevent these errors by improving mechanisms for reporting and learning through the
creation of a national database of errors, promoting an open culture to discuss errors, developing
and implementing change where errors occur, and a better understanding of the systems approach
to understanding errors. This led to the birth of the NPSA which originally housed the NRLS. It is
the largest database of patient safety incident reports in the world and has a repository of 900,000
errors annually. Of note, a high proportion of all surgical patient safety incidents are related to the
specialty of orthopaedics and trauma (145,743/446,184; 32.6%). [Panesar SS 2012] Opponents have
argued that the inherent biases of self-reporting systems limit meaningful interrogation of data.
[Vincent C 2008] Proponents argue that there could be an element of under-reporting; nevertheless
useful lessons can still be learned. Analysis of the database has led to a number of important insights
that are helping to shape national policy — for example, the recognition of the risk of bone cement
implantation syndrome associated with use of cement in hip fracture surgery, and the potential for
IT-based interventions to reduce many cases of drug allergy related morbidity. [Panesar SS 2009b;
Cresswell KM 2008] During the write-up of this thesis, the case of bone cement implantation
syndrome due to cemented hip replacements, as outlined in section 3.3.5, has followed an almost
similar course to that of metal-on-metal hip replacements. Work undertaken at the NPSA suggested
that there is an increased risk with the use of cement when using hip prostheses. [NPSA 2009c]
Whereas some orthopaedic surgeons accepted the risks and instituted the mitigating suggestions
suggested by the NPSA alert on the subject, a significant number chose to ignore it. [Timperley AJ
2009] Indeed this, together with many other examples, falls under the poor safety culture that
prevails in parts of the NHS. Recently, this has been described as 'normalisation of deviance and
wilful blindness.' [Halligan A 2013] The effect of this poor practice is two-fold: the first being that a
certain degree of harm, albeit small in relative terms, is considered acceptable, and the second being
that staff avert their gaze from unsafe care practices and choose not to report patient safety
incidents. Don Berwick in his review into patient safety in the NHS (2013) stressed the need for
constant vigilance of staff towards errors. [National Advisory Group on the Safety of Patients in
England 2013] Indeed, he suggested that managers were ignoring high mortality rates, patient safety
and inconvenient facts in order to meet performance management targets. Staffwere blinded by the
events around them and assumed that the standards being tolerated were normal. [Donnelley L
2013] This behaviour of normalising deviant behaviour is likely to have an effect on the frequency
and types of incidents that are reported to the NRLS, thereby contributing to the incompleteness of
the dataset.
The NRLS has consistently high-reporters and an equal number of low-reporters. [NPSA 2011a] If
reporting rates vary, and the quality of reports is also heterogeneous, these pose a threat to robust
and meaningful findings from the NRLS. [NPSA 2011a] The NRLS also faces varying proportions
of reports from different clinical groups: nurses report more than doctors. [Panesar SS 2009a]
Consequently there is no shortage of data on falls and pressure ulcers. Whilst this is important, the
lack of engagement by doctors is of grave concern. [Panesar SS 2009c] Even though the work in this
thesis has answered some questions and posed others, one key issue remains: there is an incomplete
picture of errors portrayed by the NRLS due to under-reporting and it is unclear what effect
complete reporting by all professionals and organisations will have on the results in this undertaking.
So, this begs the question, how can we improve the utility of the NRLS by the orthopaedic
community"? At present, there are several reporting systems. The one with significant coverage of
participants (orthopaedic surgeons) is the National ]oint Registry System, which is a voluntary
system that collects data on joint replacements from NHS hospitals and the independent healthcare
sector. At present, it has 90% coverage, [National joint Registry] which is far superior to the level of
reporting to the NRLS. Data are collected on demographics and outcomes. The agenda is driven by
the orthopaedics community. As such, an approach in the future might be to link the NRLS to the
National joint Registry to encourage reporting and learning. Another alternative might be for the
National Joint Registry to start supplying data to the NRLS. Both these approaches require a more
collaborative way ofworking between the NJR and the NRLS. Another school of thought is to have
key 'Never Events' or sentinel events such as wrong site surgery reported nationally with consequent
fiscal penalties and leave the reporting and learning of other types of errors, especially the near-
misses, to local organisations. [Department of Health 2011a] Continuous quality improvement cycles
could then be applied to eliminating or minimising these problems. [Department of Health 2013]
Annual surveys might be another avenue worth exploring; the General Medical Council (GMC) now
includes patient safety questions in its annual survey; [GMC 2011] the BOA could consider running
one such survey to identify system and organisational failures in delivering safer care.
Another strong criticism of the NRLS, which is often cited by the wider clinical community and is
common to all reporting systems, is the rather non-scientific way of analysing the database. The
NRLS does not have specialists but general clinical reviewers assessing the incidents by severity of
harm and using a consensus-based approach. [Lamont T 2009] A possible approach for the future
would include the creation of an in-house research and development team which works with
academics and clinicians to develop robust methodological approaches for analysing the database.
These approaches should help to better identify the causes of errors and also allow the database to
be used for surveillance. Initial attempts have been made to achieve these approaches: the Harms
Susceptibility Ratio [Pham JC 2010b] and the OEI (see Section 3.4).
On a similar note, Crossing theQuality Chasm urges organisations who deliver care to ensure that six
key aims are fulfilled; care should be safe, effective, patient-centred, timely, efficient and equitable.
This is especially important in high-volume specialties, such as orthopaedic surgery. [IOM 2001] The
Quality, Innovation, Productivity and Prevention (QIPP) agenda is one of the largest
transformational programmes, which has stimulated a burgeoning need to embrace safety and
quality, department of Health 2011b] Notable examples include redesigning clinical pathways for
hip surgery that allow patients to receive evidence-based best practice and shorten the length of stay
for such patients post-operatively. department of Health 2010b] Similar strides that promote local
innovation in developing safer practices need to be encouraged. This behoves organisations to
encourage newer ways of working in the specialty. Innovation must be encouraged so that services
can be reconfigured to meet local needs and be up-scaled nationally if a clear benefit has been seen.
Further upstream of the orthopaedic patient journey lay two areas that warrant further attention.
Even though procedures such as hip surgery have been described as the greatest operation of the
20th century, [Tearmonth ID 2007] the variation in rate of provision of the procedure in the UK is
almost 14-fold. Deprived populations have the lowest rate of arthroplasty. [NHS Right Care 2011]
Can this variation, in part, be explained due to a lack of robust research? I accept that some variation
might be due to clinical indications and fiscal rationing.
Historically, surgical decisions have largely been based on personal experience and recommendations
from surgical authorities. In contrast to internal medicine, trials of surgical techniques and
technologies have unique challenges and have therefore been slow to permeate the surgical
literature. In addition, regulator}' bodies have imposed less stringent controls on the validation of
these technologies. As such, most surgical practice is based on lower levels of evidence. [Jones RS
2003] Current estimates suggest that less than 5% of the orthopaedic literature represent randomised
trials, although this has been steadily increasing. [Sung ] 2008] However, even the quality of
reporting in RCTs is highly variable. Complete reporting of allocation concealment, blinding, details
of follow up and surgical expertise in trial reports has been uncommon. [Chan S 2007] Although
many orthopaedic journals (i.e. Journal ofBone andJoint Surgery, Clinical Orthopaedics and Belated Kesearch,
Acta Orthopaedica, Journal ofOrthopaedic Trauma and Orthopaedic Clinics ofNorth America) have adopted
evidence-based approaches to reporting clinical research, there remain considerable opportunities to
improve processes. Providing additional evidence-based resources and education for readers is a key
first step. [Panesar SS 2010a] Whereas double-blinded RCTs would clearly be inappropriate, there is
a need to explore alternative methods of building the evidence-base: expert-based RCTs, [Walter SD
2008] larger collaborative trials [Bhandari M 2009] and joint registries [Goldberg AJ 2012] are
potential avenues.
The second barrier to ensuring a true patient safety culture is the lack of regulation of devices. A key
example that has brought the specialty into disrepute is that ofmetal-on-metal hip replacements.
These arrived on the market almost 15 years ago and were targeted at young, active men to serve as
a joint replacement for life. Surgeons then began to use them in women too. Average seven-year
failure rates were three times that of routinely-used hip implants made from other materials. [Cohen
D 2012] The MHRA was alerted to the problem of mutagenicity resulting from the implants which
caused poisoning by slow release of metal ions into the body. However, the regulator chose to
downplay the risks by failing to publish an alert of the situation to surgeons and patients. Instead, its
recommendation was to ensure that all patients signed a consent form, in which they should have
been informed of potential risks with these implants. [MHRA 2007] The company that made these
implants continued to ignore any suggestion of risk associated with the implant. The most recent
study on the subject concluded that metal-on-metal stemmed implants give poor implant survival
compared with other options and should not be implanted. [Smith AJ 2012] While it is unfair to
assume that all devices are poorly regulated, the case ofmetal-on-metal hip replacements alerts us to
potential problems with regulation. A balance between increased regulation and innovation must be
sought.
With the NHS reforms in place, there is no doubt that commissioning will be a key driving force for
the provision of high-quality health sendees, reducing health inequalities and improving the health of
the local population. Perhaps one way of ensuring high-quality care is to inter-twine hard measures
of safety into the fabric of the commissioning process. Measures such as complication rates,
complaints, compliments, readmission rates, outcomes, mortality and morbidity data, along with
procedure specific data and patient experience questionnaires, should be up for scrutiny in the
commissioning process. Quality improvement measures such as clinical dashboards, [NPIS
Connecting for Health 2009] specialty scorecards [Hammons D 2011] and system ratings [Leapfrog
Group 2012] are all important tools that need to be disseminated wider in daily practice.
In this thesis, I sought to understand the opportunities offered by the NRLS to ascertain the
frequency, types and causes of errors in orthopaedic surgery; this has been achieved and useful
contributions have been made to the scientific literature in this area. I have also explored the
potential of using the database to predict 'risky' hospitals and this work is currently the subject of
peer-review in a leading medical journal. This will be the first time a direct measure of safety is used
to benchmark hospitals against each other in the domain of safer care. Finally, I have offered a
balanced discussion on the role of reporting systems for improving the care received by orthopaedic
patients.
Orthopaedic surgery has the potential to be the exemplar during the Zeitgeist of quality and safety.
An ageing population will undoubtedly increase the musculoskeletal burden of disease.
Technological advances on their own are inadequate to deliver world-class care. In absolute terms,
the number of orthopaedic patients suffering preventable adverse events is high. It is unacceptable
to have almost half of all AAOS surgeons who agreed to a survey state that they had observed a
medical error, ofwhich 27 cases included wrong site surgery. [Wong DA 2009] Commissioners of
care and payers, both national and private, should engage with and investigate any occurrences of
'Never Events'. This will shift the paradigm from a punitive to a blame-free culture and ensure
lessons are leamt which can be disseminated within the wider orthopaedic community. Around the
world, healthcare systems are identifying innovative ways of commissioning value-based services.
Whereas the latest technological advance may not always suit the needs of the local population,
quality and safety will be always be key in any proposed model of care. The use of a national
reporting and learning system may help, in this respect.
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Appendix 4: Correspondence with the National Joint Registry
From: David Miller (Health SD) rDavid.Miiler2.3jnoithaate-is.com1 on behalf of Health Service Desk fHealth ServiceDeskgjnorthgate-
is.coml
Sent: Monday, December 02, 2013 2:20 PM
To: Panesar, Sukhmeet S
Subject: RE: data in NJR - 1928967 (DMi)
Good Afternoon











From: Panesar, Sukhmeet S rmailtoisukhmeet.DanesarSimDerial.ac.ukl
Sent: 02 December 2013 12:55
To: enquine5Snircentre.ora.uk
Subject: data in NJR - 1928967 (DMi)
Dear Sir,
I would like to enquire whether the National Joint Registry collects any information on patients who self-harm or commit suicides whilst




Dr. Sukhmeet S. Panesar | Honorary Clinical Research Fellow |
Department of Primary Care and Public Health | Imperial College London
M: 07817 229 138
Appendix 5: Relevant Rapid Response Reports
National Patient Safety Agency
Rapid Response Report
NPSA/2009/RRR007
From reporting to learning 09 December 2009
Reducing risks of tourniquets left on after finger and toe surgery
Issue
Digital tourniquets are commonly used to provide a bloodless field in hand and toe surgery. These may be used in
operating theatres, emergency departments, GP surgeries and podiatry clinics. If digital tourniquets are accidentally left
on, they may cause substantial harm to patients.
Evidence of harm
Following a trigger incident, the National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) identified 15 serious incidents between August
2005 and November 2009 relating to digital tourniquets being left in place after surgery. Of these, 10 patients needed
further surgical treatment and two resulted in amputation. These were reported from operating theatres (nine incidents),
emergency departments (four incidents) and primary care (two incidents). Although the number of patients affected is
small, the degree of harm is great. All of these cases were preventable.
At least six of the incident reports related to surgical gloves (finger or whole) being used as tourniquets. It has become
common practice, well documented in the literature, to use surgical gloves as tourniquets (including techniques to reduce
risks by using artery clips). However, the Medicines and Healthcare Regulatory Authority (MHRA) reminds us that the use
of gloves as tourniquet in any form is beyond the manufacturer's intended purpose. As with any off-label use of medical
devices, it poses possible risks to the patients and the potential for litigation against the hospital or healthcare
professional.
Reducing the risk of harm
There are currently no national guidelines on the use of digital tourniquets and more research is needed.
The NPSA has based this report on the best available evidence to date. Key aspects of safer practice have been
identified by clinical experts which are described in the supporting information. These include robust processes to control
and reconcile the number of tourniquets used, ensuring that they are removed at the end of the procedure and using CE
marked tourniquets with design features (labels and/or colour) to ensure they are clearly visible at all times.
For IMMEDIATE ACTION by all organisations where hand and foot surgery are carried out in the NHS and
independent sector. Deadline for ACTION COMPLETE is 9 June 2010.
Local organisations should ensure that:
1. Guidelines include the removal of digital tourniquets as part of the swab counting procedure and specify the need
to record the length of time a tourniquet is in place.
2. CE marked digital tourniquets which are labelled and/or brightly coloured should be used, in accordance with
manufacturers' instructions. Surgical gloves should not be used as tourniquets.
3. The WHO Surgical Safety Checklist is reviewed locally to consider adding tourniquet removal at 'Sign Out' stage.
4. The NPSA clinical briefing sheet is used to raise awareness of risks using digital tourniquets and safer practice
recommendations (www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/tourniquets).
Further information
Supporting information on this Rapid Response Report is available at www.nrls.npsa.nhs.uk/tourniquets. Further queries
should be directed to Fran Watts at rrr@npsa.nhs.uk: telephone 020 7927 9890.
NPSA has informed: NHS Organisations, the independent sector, commissioners, regulators and relevant professional
bodies in England and Wales.
Gateway ref: 12662
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Mitigating surgical risk in patients undergoing hip arthroplasty for fractures of
the proximal femur
Around 60,000 planned total hip replacements and 60,000 repairs of hip fractures are carried out annually in the UK. The
mortality rate following partial hip replacement after fracture treatment is ten times higher than with a planned hip
replacement. Patients undergoing surgery after fracture are older, generally more ill and are in need of an emergency
operation. The mortality rate is significantly higher if surgery is delayed more than 48 hours.
The most common cause of sudden intra-operative death during arthroplasty is the occurrence of venous embolisation
of fat and marrow contents. This phenomenon is exacerbated by poor patient preparation, dehydration and significant
co-morbidities and is associated with instrumentation of the canal and finally cement insertion. At the time of
arthroplasty, embolism can occur when cement is used but has also been reported with cementless implants. The
National Hip Fracture Data Base (NHFD) has recently started data collection of hemiarthroplasty use.
The National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) is aware of 26 patient deaths and 6 cases of severe harm where bone
cement was used during hip surgery between October 2003 and October 2008. Most occurred during hemiarthroplasty
carried out as an emergency. The voluntary nature of reporting means that conclusions cannot be drawn from these data
on the relative safety of uncemented and cemented prostheses. The Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory
Agency (MHRA) also received reports of 19 further patient deaths where cement was used during hip surgery and 6
cases of severe harm, although the cause of the incidents is unclear.
There are clinical situations where the use of cement is indicated or where the use of cement will produce a better
clinical outcome. In all situations the clinician needsto make a risk benefit assessment based on the actions belowto
mitigate the risk no matter what implant is chosen.
For PRECAUTIONARY ACTION by clinical directors of surgery in the NHS and the independent
sector. The deadline date for ACTION COMPLETE is 14 September 2009
Organisations should:
1. Report to the NPSA and MHRA every peri-operative harm or patient death for total hip
replacement and hemiarthroplasty, stating use of cemented or uncemented prosthesis and share
the results of local investigations with the NPSA.
2. Review local guidelines and audit current activity against best practice including submitting data
to the NHFD, and reduce risks as follows:
Patient assessment:
• Identifying patients at risk (e.g. those with pre-existing cardiopulmonary dysfunction), assessing
fitness for surgery and most appropriate technique
Anaesthetic technique:
• Maintain normovolemia throughout the procedure, particularly prior to cement insertion
• Maintain particular vigilance during instrumentation and fixation of the implant
Surgical technique:
• Thorough pressurised lavage of the femoral canal before broaching the canal and further
instrumentation of the femur
• Consider a suction catheter to reduce the pressure in the intramedullary canal
• Introducing cement into the femur in retrograde fashion via a cement gun
» Communication with the anaesthetist regarding when cement is to be inserted
The NPSA has informed:
All NHS organisations, the independent sector, commissioners, regulators and relevant professional bodies.
Further information
Supporting information including detailed international guidance is available at www.npsa.nhs.uk/rrr or contact
Dr Kevin Cleary c/o rrr@npsa.nhs.uk
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Essential care after an inpatient fall
Issue
Each year around 282,000 patient falls are reported to the NPSA from hospitals and mental health units, A significant
number of these falls result in death, severe or moderate injury including around 840 fractured hips, 550 other types of
fracture, and 30 intracranial injuries
Evidence of harm
Analysis of patient safety incidents reported to the National Reporting and Learning System (in the 12 months prior to 25
March 2010) indicates that around 200 patients with fractures or intracranial injury after a fall in hospital experienced
some failure of aftercare. Problems included:
• delayed diagnosis of fractures, ranging from several hours to several days after the fall,
• neurological observations not recorded at all or recorded at inadequate intervals, resulting in delayed diagnosis
of intracranial bleeding,
• sling hoists used to move patients despite signs or symptoms of limb fracture or spinal injury,
• delays in access to urgent investigations or surgery.
Reducing the risk of harm
When a serious injury occurs as a result of an inpatient fall, safe manual handling and prompt assessment and treatment
is critical to the patient s chances of making a full recovery This RRR aims to ensure that local protocols and systems
help staff to consistently achieve this.
For IMMEDIATE ACTION by all NHS organisations that have inpatient beds. The deadline for ACTION
COMPLETE is 14 July 2011.
NHS organisations with inpatient beds should ensure that:
1 They have a post-fall protocol that includes:
a) checks by nursing staff for signs or symptoms of fracture or potential for spinal injury before the
patient is moved,
b) safe manual handling methods for patients with signs or symptoms of fracture or potential for spinal
injury*.
c) frequency and duration of neurological observations for all patients where head injury has occurred
or cannot be excluded (e.g. unwitnessed falls) based on National Institute for Health and Clinical
Excellence (NICE) Clinical Guideline 56: Head Injury
d) timescales for medical examination following a fall (including fast track assessment for patients with
signs of serious injury, or high vulnerability to injury, or who have been immobilised)
2. Their post-fall protocol is easily accessible (e g laminated versions at nursing stations).
3 Their staff have access to clear guidance and formats for recording neurological observations using a 15
point version of the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS) and that changes in the GCS that should trigger urgent
medical review are highlighted.
4 Their staff have access at all times to special equipment (e g. hard collars, flat-lifting equipment, scoops)* and
colleagues with the expertise to use it, for patients with suspected fracture or potential for spinal injury
5 Systems are in place allowing inpatients injured in a fall access to investigation and specialist treatment' that
is equal in speed and quality to that provided in emergency departments and conforms to NICE Clinical
Guideline 56: Head Injury
* Community hospitals arxJ mental health units without the equipment or expertise may be able to achieve this in
collaboration with emergency services.
Further information Supporting information on this Rapid Response Report is available at
www nrls npsa rihs uk/alerts.
For further queries contact rrr@npsa nhs.uk: Telephone 020 7927 9500
Gateway ref: 15328
t National Patient Safety Agency 2011. Copyright and other Intellectual property rights in this material belong to the NPSA and all rights are reserved. The NPSA
authorises UK healthcare organisations to reproduce this matenal for educational and non-commercial use
